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I. INTRODUCTION
Over sixty-six billion dollars were spent in 1997 on interstate and
international long-distance telecommunications services.1 MacAvoy and

Taylor argue that, despite price decreases, this telecommunications market
is characterized by prices that exceed competitive levels because the price
decreases have not kept pace with decreases in costs.2 Some counter that
this conclusion results from incorrect measurement of prices, but Taylor
and Zona reexamine the question from many perspectives and still
conclude "that it is very unlikely that the interstate long-distance market is
effectively competitive." 3 Due to the sheer size of the market, even a
potential failure of competition must be taken seriously. Departures
from
4
competitive outcomes can have enormous welfare consequences. This was
one motivation behind passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
(Act),5 which, among other things, removed the legal prohibition that
prevented Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) from providing certain
interLATA (long-distance) services. The theory is that, under the right
conditions, the BOCs could inject vigorous new competition into
interLATA markets and could also compete to provide new services for
which there is pent-up demand, such as one-stop shopping for
7
telecommunications services.
Section 271 of the Act outlines the process that BOCs use to obtain
1. See James Zolnierek et al., Long-distanceMarket Shares FourthQuarter1998 at 18
tbl.3.4 (visited Nov. 16, 1999) <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrierlReports/
FCC-StateLink/ IAD/mksh3q98.pdf>.
2. See PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE FAILURE OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION TO

ESTABLISH CoMmTITnoN INLONG-DisTANCE TELEPHONE SERvicE-s 1-6 (1996); see generally
William E. Taylor & Lester D. Taylor, PostdivestitureLong-distance Competition in the
UnitedStates, 83 AM. ECON. Rv. 185 (1993).
3. William E. Taylor & J.Douglas Zona, An Analysis of the State of Competition in
Long-distance Telephone Markets, 11 J.
REG.ECON. 251, 227-55 (1997).
4. See Paul W. MacAvoy et al., Should Local Telephone Companies be Allowed to
Enter the Long-distance Market? A Regulatory Conundrum (Feb. 1999) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Federal Communications Law Journal); see generally Paul J.
Hinton et al., An Analysis of the Welfare Effects of Long-distance Market Entry by an
IntegratedAccess and Long-distanceProvider,13 J.REG. ECON. 183, 183-96 (1998).

5. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
6. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. 111996).
7. See Harold Ware, Competition and DiversificationTrends in Telecommunications:
Regulatory, Technological,and MarketPressures,13 J.REG.ECON. 59 (1998).
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relief from their line-of-business restriction on interLATA services." BOCs
must apply on a state-by-state basis to the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) for permission to offer interLATA services, and the
FCC must render its decision within ninety days? The FCC may not grant
permission unless it finds that four broad conditions are met. 0 First, the
BOC must either provide access and interconnection to its network
pursuant to agreements with competing providers of local exchange
services or have received no requests for access and interconnection." The
former is called a 'Track A" application, while the latter is known as
"Track B.",12 Second, the BOC must satisfy a competitive checklist, either
through its interconnection agreements or through a statement of generally
available terms for access and interconnection (SGAT).' Third, the BOC
must provide its interLATA services through a separate affiliate that meets
certain structural requirements and nondiscrimination safeguards.' 4 Fourth,
BOC provision of interLATA service5 must be "consistent with the public
interest, convenience, and necessity."'
At this writing, the FCC has rejected five applications, approved one,
and is currently reviewing one.16 Southwestern Bell was first to apply,
requesting permission to offer interLATA service in Oklahoma.' 7 After
deciding that Southwestern Bell met neither the Track A nor Track B
requirements, the FCC denied this application. 8 Ameritech Michigan
followed and was the first application to pass the first condition.' 9 Although

the FCC declared that Ameritech satisfied Track A, the FCC decided that
several checklist items were not met and that Ameritech's long-distance
8. See 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3) (Supp. 111996).

9.
10.
11.
12.

See id.
See id,
See id. § 271 (d)(3)(A)(i).
See Application by SBC Comm., Inc., Pursuant to Section 271 of the Comm. Act of

1934, as amended, to Provide In-region, InterLATA Servs. in Oklahoma, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 8685, para. 1, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 198 (1997)
[hereinafter Oklahoma Order].

13. See 47 U.S.C. § 271 (d)(3)(A)(i).
14. See id,
§ 271 (d)(3)(B).
15. Id. § 271 (d)(3)(C).
16. See Ceci Stephens, Common CarrierBureau Current Issues: November Edition
1999 (visited Nov. 15, 1999) <http:llwww.fcc.gov/ccb/Cmttop.html#Section_271Applications>.
17. See Oklahoma Order,12 F.C.C.R. 8685, para. 1, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 198.
18. Seeid. atpara.2.
19. See Application of Ameritech Michigan Pursuant to Section 271 of the Comm. Act
of 1934, as amended, to Provide In-region, InterLATA Servs. in Michigan, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267 (1997) [hereinafter
Michigan Order].
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affiliate did not satisfy the structural requirements and denied the
application. 2 BellSouth submitted applications in South Carolina and
21
Louisiana. In regard to the South Carolina application, the FCC decided
that BellSouth did not meet the Track B requirements, did not seriously
apply under Track A, and did not satisfy some checklist items.2 The FCC
did not rule on whether BellSouth met Track A or Track B in Louisiana.
Instead, the FCC relied exclusively on its decision that the checklist

problems from South Carolina were also present in Louisiana. BellSouth
reapplied in Louisiana exclusively under Track A.2 Despite much
disagreement, the FCC declined to rule on whether BellSouth met the

Track A requirements and denied the application due to ongoing checklist
problems and some problems with the structural and nondiscrimination

compliance of BellSouth's long-distance affiliate.2- Bell Atlantic submitted
an application in New York, which the FCC approved, and SBC submitted
an application in Texas, which is currently under review.
The FCC and courts address the issues concerning section 271
application requirements in the six existing Orders, 27 decisions by the

courts, as well as in other statements by the FCC. This Article considers

20. See id. at para. 6.

21. See Application of BellSouth Corp., et al. Pursuant to Section 271 of the Comm.
Act of 1934, as amended to Provide In-region, InterLATA Servs. in S.C., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 539, paras. 539, 541, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 870 (1998)
[hereinafter South Carolina Order]; Application of BellSouth Corp., et al. Pursuant to
Section 271 of the Comm. Act of 1934, as amended, to Provide In-region, InterLATA
Servs. in La., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 6245, 11 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
328 (1998) [hereinafter LouisianaOrder].

22. See South Carolina Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 539, paras. 8-9, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
870.
23. See LouisianaOrder,13 F.C.C.R. 6245, para. 1, 11 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 328.
24. See Application of BellSouth Corp., BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., and BellSouth
Long-distance, Inc., for Provision of In-region InterLATA Servs. in La., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 20,599, 13 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1082 (1998) [hereinafter
LouisianaH Order].

25. See Louisiana Order,13 F.C.C.R. 6245, para. 55, 11 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 328.
26. See Application by Bell Atlantic N.Y. for Authorization Under Section 271 of the
Comm. Act to Provide In-region, InterLATA Serv. in the State of N.Y., Memorandum
Opinion and Order,FCC 99-404, 1999 WL 1243135 (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafterNew York
Order];Comments Requested on Application by SBC Comm. Inc. for Authorization Under
Section 271 of the Comm. Act to Provide In-region InterLATA Service in the State of Tex.,
FCC
Public
Notice
DAOO-37
(Jan.
10,
2000),
available at
<http:llwww.fcc.govIBureaus/Common-CarrierlPublicNotices/da000037.txt>.
27. See New York Order, FCC 99-404, 1999 WL 1243135; Louisiana Order II, 13

F.C.C.R. 20,599, 13 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1082; Louisiana Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 6245, 11
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 328; South CarolinaOrder, 13 F.C.C.R. 539, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
870; Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267 (1997); Oklahoma
Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 8685, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 198 (1997).
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the FCC's positions on most of these issues and evaluates whether these
positions make economic sense and are consistent with the Act. To provide
a foundation for considering these issues, Part II reviews the basic
economics of BOCs' entry into interLATA markets. Part III presents the
most contentious issues, while Part IV addresses related issues. A few
differences between the current and former FCC commissioners surface in
this evaluation. Part V summarizes the FCC's sound positions and advice
for future BOCs' applications.
This Article does not evaluate the entire section 271 process. Many
parties-including industry, regulators, academics, and legislators-bear
some responsibility for the fact that nearly four years passed from the time
the Act became law before any BOC gained relief from its line-of-business
restriction. The actions of these parties notwithstanding, the present
purpose is a much more modest review of only the basic economics and
decisions issued by the FCC. On this, the Author reaches two broad
conclusions. First, the federal regulators have performed admirably with
regard to checklist compliance (except for the emphasis on TELRIC
pricing and the "pick and choose" rule) and structural/nondiscrimination
safeguards. Second, the FCC's performance on Track A/B compliance and
public interest issues is less impressive. The pages that follow provide the
rationale for these conclusions.

II. ECONOMICS OF BOCs' ENTRY INTO INTERLATA MARiTS
Essentially, the economic rationale for allowing BOCs' entry into
interLATA markets is that free and open competition brings about the
lowest possible prices and a mix of services that is as closely aligned with
consumers' preferences as possible.2 The 1982 consent decree imposed the
line-of-business restriction only on BOCs after the court found that as long
as local exchange service providers were allowed to sell long-distance
service, competition in long-distance service could not be free and open.29
This view was a product of the former integrated Bell System's alleged
anticompetitive tactics toward its emerging rivals.3° These tactics generally1
involved the use of the local network to accomplish a Bell System policy.
Although there are many variants for the economic analysis, this Article
places these tactics into two broad categories: tie-in sales and raising rivals'

28. See ANDREU MAs-COLELLET A., MICROECONOMIc THEORY 326 (1995).

29. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982); aff'd, Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
30. See B. DOuGLAs BERNHEIM & ROBERT D. WLnIo, THE SCOPE OF CoMPErnON IN
TELECOMMUNCATIONS 6-27 (1996).

31. See id.
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costs. Today, the economic arguments against BOCs entry into interLATA
markets can still ultimately be attributed either to one of these two tactics
or to the pursuit of the further policy goal of giving BOCs' incentives to
reduce barriers to entry into the local exchange business.

A.

Tie-in Sales

A tie-in sale is a seller-imposed restriction requiring a purchaser
interested in purchasing one product from the seller to buy both of the
seller's products.32 In its simplest form, a tie-in sale is imposed by a
monopoly seller of one product when it dictates to largely homogeneous
purchasers that the monopoly-supplied product-the "tying" good-can
only be bought if the purchaser also buys from the monopoly supplier a
second, more competitively-supplied, product-the "tied" good.33 In this
way, the monopolist is thought to "extend the monopoly" to the more
competitive market, thereby enabling the monopolist to charge a higher
price for the tied good. 34 For example, concern might arise that a BOC
would only sell its monopoly-provided local exchange service if a
consumer agreed to buy, at a premium,
the more competitively-supplied
35
long-distance service from the BOC.
While this story was intuitively appealing and initially adopted by the
courts as an explanation for anticompetitive conduct, closer scrutiny
reveals that this situation may provide no motive for the monopoly supplier
to tie its sales. Any attempt to charge a premium for the tied good is
viewed by consumers as an add-on to the price of the tying good because
consumers can always purchase just the tied good from the competitive
suppliers." Hence, the combination of this add-on and the price charged for
the monopoly-supplied good cannot exceed the amount consumers are
willing to pay for the monopoly-supplied good. If it does, consumers will
simply forego the monopoly-supplied good and buy the other good from a
competitive supplier.38 Thus, if consumers are largely homogeneous, the
monopolist cannot extract any more profit by tying than it can by simply
charging the most consumers are willing to pay for the monopoly-supplied
product and imposing no tying restrictions."
32. See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 467 (2d ed. 1994).
33. See id. at 470.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 476-77.
36. See id at 473.
37. See id at 473-74.
38. See iL
39. See id. at 473.
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The failure of this simple story to explain tying behavior has led to
the study of what will actually lead to a tie-in sale. Not all of the objectives
identified in the literature apply to potential BOCs' behavior. Indeed, the
most basic tying story, that a BOC would refuse to sell local exchange
service unless a consumer buys long-distance from the BOC, is largely
irrelevant because existing regulations prohibit this behavior. To further the
proper categorization and analysis of the allegations of tying in the FCC's
section 271 Orders, this Article lists the main objectives. The six main
objectives are as followsY' The first objective is to achieve efficiency
through scope economies either in production or purchasing.4' This is
welfare-enhancing and occurs with such frequency that it is usually not
even recognized as a tie-in sale.42 Any assembled product can be viewed
this way, such as a car or the fact that shoes are always sold with laces.
Either product could be sold in its constituent parts, but it would be
inefficient to do so. This objective should generally be of no concern to
regulators and antitrust authorities.
43
Suppose, in the simple
The second objective is to evade regulations.
story above, the monopolist is price regulated so that it cannot extract full
monopoly profit from sales of the tying good. Then a tying policy that
forces consumers to buy the tied good at inflated prices in order to obtain
the tying good gives the monopolist a way to obtain its monopoly profit
despite regulations designed to protect consumers. This objective should be
of great concern to regulators.
The third objective is to granta secretprice reduction.4 In oligopoly
markets, there is often an incentive for sellers to cut price if they can do so
without stimulating a matching price reduction by rivals. One way to do
this is to sell a second good at below-market prices, along with the
oligopoly-supplied good, thereby effectively reducing the price of the
oligopoly-supplied good. For this to be successful, it must be difficult for
rivals to observe sales of the second good. Since this strategy enhances
consumer welfare through lower prices, it should generally be of no
concern to regulators and antitrust authorities.
The fourth objective is to assure quality.4 5 If the quality of one good
is affected by the quality of another good, then a seller can indicate to
consumers that it is a high-quality supplier, and thereby charge a higher

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See Ud at 471-79.
See id. at 467.
See id.
See id. at 468.
See id. at 469.
See id.
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price, if it only supplies the first good as part of a package with the second
good. For example, since long-distance calls must traverse local networks,
the quality of local service affects the quality of a long-distance call.
Hence, a telecommunications supplier might require consumers to
purchase its local service in order to obtain its long-distance service. In the
telecommunications industry, this tie does not use the monopoly-supplied
local exchange service to tie the competitively-supplied long-distance
service, as the simple story above suggests. Rather, the tie works in exactly
the opposite direction. This shows that the construction of a tie-in sale can
reveal much about its objective, and hence the level of concern it should
elicit from regulators and antitrust authorities. This objective for tying
should be of no concern to regulators and antitrust authorities, since the
higher price obtained through the tie-in sale merely reflects higher quality
(although the presence of market power in either of the markets may be a
legitimate source of concern irrespective of tying).
The fifth objective is to price discriminate.46 In the simple story
above, consumers were largely homogenous. If instead consumers have
diverse views about the desirability of the monopoly-supplied good, there
is no single price the monopolist can charge to extract the maximum profit
from every consumer. A tie-in sale can allow the monopolist to price
discriminate when the monopoly-supplied good is purchased in single units
at the same time that multiple units of the tied good are purchased. For
example, Xerox was once a monopoly supplier of photocopiers but faced
competition from other suppliers of paper. Tying sales of its machines to
sales of its overpriced paper allowed Xerox to extract a higher effective
price for its machines from the purchasers who valued copying services the
most, since such consumers are generally the largest users of paper. Such a
policy must include a lower price for the monopoly-supplied good than
would be charged in the absence of the tie, otherwise too many purchasers
will simply elect to not buy. Thus, the tie-in benefits low-volume users at
the expense of high-volume users. This outcome is characteristic of price
discrimination. Some consumers benefit while other consumers are
harmed, which means that any intervention by regulators or antitrust
authorities involves a difficult weighing of one group's interests against the
interests of another group.
The final objective is to deter entry or induce exit.47 The intuitive idea
that tie-in sales are anticompetitive stems from the notion that the tying
firm will "extend its monopoly" to another market. 48 The assumption in the
46. See iL at 471-79.
47. See id. at 467 n.3.
48. Il at 467.
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above simple story is that this does not occur because the market for the
tied good is assumed to be competitive and its structure is assumed to be
unaffected by the tying restriction. Recently, Michael D. Whinston
revisited the original intuition-tying is anticompetitive-by studying a
model in which tying can materially affect the intensity of competition in
the market for the tied good.49 He found that tying can indeed result in
market foreclosure and higher prices, provided: (1) the market for the tied
good is an oligopoly producing under conditions of increasing returns; (2)
the tying firm has the ability to credibly precommit to tying before setting
its prices; and (3) the decision to participate in the market is made before
prices are set.
The logic is that the tying firm credibly announces, in advance, that it
will only offer its monopoly product as part of a bundle with its
oligopolistically-supplied product. This causes the other oligopolists to
realize that, unless they charge a lower price than planned, they will lose
sales to the tying firm for those consumers who value the monopolysupplied product. This realization, in conjunction with the higher costs
associated with a smaller scale of operation, may cause the potential
profitability of the oligopolists to drop so much that they choose not to
participate in the market. Once this choice is made, the tying firm is then
free to raise its price for the tied good even higher, thereby earning
monopoly profit on both the tying good and the tied good and
accomplishing the feared extension of monopoly. The oligopolists must
believe, however, the tying firm's announcement, for otherwise they will
simply choose to participate in the market, thereby presenting the tying
firm with a fait accompli and forcing the tying firm to abandon its tying
strategy as in the simple story above. In effect, the tying firm must have a
visible way to precommit that it will only offer the products as a bundle,
and it must not be considered possible or cost-effective for the tying firm to
later escape this commitment. This objective for tying should be of great
concern to regulators and antitrust authorities, since it reveals that there
may indeed be an extension of monopoly objective for tying. In order to
determine whether this objective exits, the tying firm's ability to
sufficiently precommit to the tie, the timing of entry/exit decisions, and
industry returns to scale must be assessedS1
Of these objectives, only two, five, and six are potentially welfarereducing. For the particular case of BOCs' entry into interLATA markets,
49. See Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure,and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. Rsv.
837, 838 n.4 (1990).
50. See id at 839.
51. See id. at 839-40, 855.
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all three of these objectives are reduced by either of two extant regulatory
policies. First, long-distance equal access is a direct attack on the BOCs'
ability to tie sales of local service to sales of long-distance service. Equal
access regulations were phased-in as part of the 1982 AT&T consent
decree and require that BOCs give the same access to all long-distance
sellers.52 The question at hand is whether long-distance equal access rules
are stringent enough to overcome objectives two, five, and six in the
presence of a joint provider of both local and long-distance service.
Although there is limited experience with this scenario, mostly positive
experience with GTE and BOCs provision of cellular and information
services suggests that existing equal access rules are adequate.s Since
experience demonstrates that long-distance equal access is workable,
except for ongoing problems with slamming, it seems unlikely that BOCs
could impose a tie on consumers without incurring substantial regulatory
backlash. BOCs today certainly cannot defend tying by resorting to the
suspect arguments about technical and administrative feasibility and
quality control that AT&T used before 1982.'5 These arguments should not
be confused with the other beneficial objectives for tying. BOCs may
indeed offer one-stop shopping bundles in order to utilize economies of
scope in either production or purchasing, offer less-visible price reductions,
or assure consumers of a quality bundle of telecommunications services.
But, as discussed above, these objectives should be of no regulatory
concern.
The second policy reducing undesirable objectives for tying is better
characterized as the group of policies designed to introduce competition
into the market for local exchange service. To the extent these policies are
successful, BOCs lose their monopoly control over the tying good and with
it their ability to impose a tie. Such policies have other attractions, since
they may ultimately replace regulation of local exchange service with
competition, eliminating the need for the traditional regulation at the retail
level along with the need to regulate long-distance equal access. 55 But such
policies are also proving very regulatory and litigious to implement, and, as
52. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982); aff'd, Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
53. See Testimony of Alfred E. Kahn & Timothy J. Tardiff at 61-69, Application of
SBC Comm. Inc., S.W. Bell Tel. Co., and S.W. Bell Comm. Servs., Inc. for Provision of Inregion, InterLATA Servs. in Mo. (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Nov. 20, 1998) (No. TO-99-

227).
54. See BERNHE]m

& WH.UG, supra note 30, at 14; see generally PEM TEMIN, THE

FALL OFTHE BELL SYsTEM: A STUDY INPRICEs AND POLITICS (1987).
55. See T. Randolph Beard et al., Regulation, Vertical Integration, and Sabotage 4
(Mar. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Federal Communications Law
Journal).
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they are currently emerging, they simply replace regulation at the retail
level with regulation at the wholesale level. As discussed above, however,
even if these policies completely fail, BOCs can still be allowed to sell
interLATA service with their tying objectives controlled as long as there
are effective long-distance equal access policies. There may still be large
benefits to opening local markets. It is just that any such benefits do not
arise from better control of BOCs' incentives to tie.
B.

Raising Rivals' Costs
One way to conceptualize the alleged anticompetitive tactics cited by
critics of the former integrated Bell System is to view the tactics as
variations on the common theme of trying to make it more costly for
competitors to produce, while striving to increase prices the Bell System
could charge and, in the extreme, enabling monopoly pricing.5 The central
tool for this is control of the local transport, switching, and distribution
systems, since these systems have historically been essential for providing
long-distance service.5 Although this is changing (indeed, the FCC
concluded in the 1998 Orderaffecting BellSouth's application in Louisiana
that PCS providers might be considered competing providers of local
exchange service for the purpose of meeting Track A requirements), there
remains great concern over the BOCs' control of local exchanges. Critics
of the integrated Bell System allege that the Bell System tried to raise its
rivals' costs by charging MCI higher prices for access than AT&T Long
Lines, delaying entry through strategic use of the regulatory process,
insisting on an unreasonably large number of access points for longdistance competitors, failing to negotiate in good faith, arbitrarily
disconnecting competitors' lines or otherwise interfering with call
completion, and generally making it time consuming
for competitors to
59
obtain access to facilities and conduct necessary work.
Since these tactics were so widespread in the final years of the
integrated Bell System, little consideration was given to whether AT&T
had incentives to raise its rivals' costs.' ° AT&T's behavior could only be
explained by the presence of such incentives." Hence, the regulatory
56. See Mark Sievers, Should the InterLATA Restriction Be Lifted? Analysis of the
Significant Issues app. 1 at 9 (July 6, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
FederalCommunicationsLaw Journat).
57. I at app. 1 at 8.
58. See LouisianaOrder, 13 F.C.C.R 6245, paras. 72-73, 11 Comm. Reg. (P & F-)328
(1998).
59. See Sievers, supranote 56, at app. 1 at 8-10.
60. See id. at app. 1 at 12.
61. See id,
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solutions of the day focused on controlling AT&T's ability to raise its
rivals' costs. Ultimately, the courts decided that regulation could not
control this ability and removed the inventive through divestiture and the
line-of-business restrictions. However, today BOCs' entry into interLATA
markets is prospective and, although the BOCs' emerging rivals in local
service markets and future rivals in long-distance markets allege many
instances of this type of BOCs behavior, a lively debate has developed over
whether BOCs even have incentives to engage in such behavior.
This literature is targeted toward the study of a BOC's discrimination
against a rival provider of interLATA service. Some reinterpretation may
yield insights into BOCs' discrimination against a competing local
exchange carrier (CLEC), but the vertical relationship is bilateral in the
local exchange market and thus the existing models do not fit this situation.
For this reason, the raising rivals' cost debate is presented here in the
context of interLATA competition, as it has emerged in the literature.
To understand this debate, assume that a BOC is authorized to
provide interLATA service and indeed has some ability to raise rivals'
costs. In current jargon, this is sometimes referred to as the ability to
"sabotage" a rival. 62 It might seem intuitively obvious that the BOC should
then exercise this ability, but there are some potential tradeoffs for the
BOC.6 1 The main tradeoff cited in the literature is that BOCs earn
substantial profits from access charges paid by their long-distance rivals for
completion of calls on the local network, so any action taken by a BOC
that reduces its rivals' long-distance output also reduces the BOC's profit."
The mere existence of access charges above cost raises rivals' costs, but, in
the current scenario, these charges are levied by regulators, not BOCs, and
so are only under indirect BOC influence through lobbying and regulatory
proceedings.6 In any case, the clear trend is toward reducing these
charges." For the BOC, lost access profit must be balanced against gains
obtained in the long-distance market due to rivals' reduced
competitiveness. There are eight key ingredients that determine this
balance. 67
The extent of product differentiation in long-distance services." If
62. See David Mandy, Killing the Goose that May Have Laid the Golden Egg: Only the
DataKnow Whether SabotagePays, J. REG. ECON. (forthcoming).
63. See id.
64. See id.

65. See FCC, Trends in Telephone Service at 4 tbl.1.2 (visited Jan. 17, 2000) <http://
www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-State_-Link/IAD/trend298.pdf>.

66. See id.
67. See Mandy, supra note 62, at 4.

68. See id.
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BOC long-distance services are viewed by consumers as very similar to
other long-distance services, then the BOC can readily supplant the sales
its rivals' lose due to sabotage with its own sales, thereby mitigating the
effects of lost profits from access charges. Alternatively, if BOC longdistance services are viewed by consumers as dissimilar to other longdistance services, then the BOC may not be able to replace all of its rivals'
lost sales with its own sales.
The cost of carrying out sabotage.'9 If it is inexpensive for the BOC
to sabotage its rivals then, other things equal, the BOC will have greater
incentive to pursue sabotage. Note that the BOC's cost of sabotage may
consist of many components. The direct cost of issuing prices and
standards that are costly for rivals, and refusing to negotiate, may be quite
modest. The direct cost of interfering with call completion and generally
making it time consuming for competitors to obtain access to facilities and
conduct necessary work is probably more substantial, while the direct cost
of engaging in lengthy negotiations and regulatory processes may be even
greater. But all of these direct costs may be quite small compared to the
potential gain from sabotage. Of more concern for the BOC is the indirect
cost of regulatory backlash if its sabotage is convincingly revealed. This
cost is likely to be large and virtually certain if the BOC engages in blatant
sabotage, like charging access prices above the regulated prices or
interfering with long-distance equal access. Note that this is an area in
which the current situation does not parallel the predivestiture setting, since
access charges are now completely regulated and substantial experience
has been gained with long-distance equal access. These regulations make
sabotage more costly for BOCs than it was for the integrated Bell System.
Note also that an inability to engage in sabotage can simply be thought of
as aprohibitivelyhigh cost of carrying out sabotage. By viewing things this
way, both the BOCs' incentive and ability to sabotage their rivals can be
captured through the cost of sabotage.
0 If the
The structure of production costs for long-distance services.7
marginal cost of providing long-distance service is increasing, then it
becomes progressively more costly for the BOC to replace its rivals' longdistance service with its own. Hence the BOC may find it profitable to
engage in some sabotage, but not to raise its rivals' costs so high that they
exit the market. An extreme case of this occurs when the BOC has a
capacity constraint in its production of long-distance services. This is akin
to a marginal cost that suddenly becomes infinite, making further
substitution of its rivals' long-distance service with its own long-distance
69. See id.
70. See id.
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service impossible.
The relative efficiency of the producersof long-distance services. If
the BOC has lower production costs for long-distance services than its
rivals, then the profit the BOC can generate by selling a unit of longdistance service is greater than the profit (gross of access charges) its rivals
can generate by selling that same unit. Hence, even if the BOC can capture
all of its rivals' profits through access charges, the BOC prefers to sell the
unit itself, and therefore the BOC might try to sabotage in order to shift
sales to its own long-distance service. Alternatively, if the BOC is
relatively inefficient in the production of long-distance services, then its
rivals can generate more gross profit on each unit of long-distance service.
If the BOC can capture more of this profit through access charges than it
can generate by producing the long-distance service itself, then the BOC
does not want to sabotage its rivals.
The degree of autonomy granted to the BOC's long-distance
subsidiary.7 2 If decisions regarding the BOC's long-distance quantities,
prices, and/or service mix are independent or quasi-independent of
sabotage decisions, then the tradeoff between access profit and profit from
long-distance sales will generally differ from the tradeoff confronting a
fully vertically integrated firm. Without complete coordination, the extra
profit the BOC can obtain by enhancing its own long-distance sales
through sabotage may be more limited relative to the accompanying lost
access profit. Moreover, if the BOC cannot completely insulate its longdistance subsidiary from the effects of sabotage then sabotage will harm its
own long-distance sales.
The intensity of competition in the marketfor long-distance services.7
If long-distance competition is intense, then the BOC has less potential to
earn profit as a seller of long-distance services but also obtains more profit
from its sales of access because intense long-distance competition drives
up long-distance volume. Thus, intense long-distance competition
discourages sabotage as it makes access sales a relatively more profitable
activity for the BOC.
The intensity of competition in the market for access.74 If there is
intense competition for sales of access, then the BOC gains less from
sabotage because sabotage will cause the purchasers of access (i.e., the
sellers of long-distance services) to switch to alternative suppliers of
access. Thus competition in the market for access discourages sabotage.
71. See id
72. See idat 5.

73. See id
74. See id.
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This observation provides another rationale for the policies, mentioned
above, that are designed to introduce competition into the market for local
exchange service, since sellers of local exchange service also provide longdistance access to their end-customers.
The size of the profit margin on sales of access!.5 A large profit

margin on access sales (perhaps created by access price regulation)
discourages sabotage, other things equal, since it makes the BOC's access
sales relatively more profitable than its long-distance sales. This is
somewhat paradoxical, since regulated prices that exceed costs are
normally regarded as inefficient. Essentially, there are two sources of
inefficiency here: sabotage and regulated access prices that exceed costs. A
BOC has stronger incentives to create one of these inefficiencies, if it can,
when the other is small.
Not surprisingly, the conclusions obtained regarding BOCs' ability
and incentive to sabotage depend on the assumptions made on these eight
points. Nicholas Economides presents the most straightforward model of
BOCs sabotage. He assumes perfectly homogeneous long-distance
products, absolutely free sabotage, constant marginal cost of long-distance
production, identical efficiency of all firms in long-distance production
(initially), fully-integrated long-distance and sabotage decisions, a
quantity-setting oligopoly in the market for long-distance services, no
competition in the market for access, and a positive fixed profit margin for
access. Not surprisingly, he finds that BOCs will severely sabotage their
rivals to the point of driving them from the long-distance market.7 Since
sabotage is free and the BOC can expand its own output indiscriminately
with no increase in marginal costs and no cost disadvantage vis-a-vis its
rivals, the BOC clearly has no cost incentive to refrain from driving its
rivals' costs up to the point where their production is unprofitable!"
Moreover, since the BOC long-distance service is perfectly substitutable
for the rival long-distance services and no access competition exists, no
potential sales are lost if all rivals are driven out of the market. 9 Yet, if the
BOC permits any rivals to remain in the market, it must share the profit
with them in the quantity-setting oligopoly, obtaining some of its rivals'
profit through the positive access margin while losing whatever profit
accrues to the still-functioning rivals and losing profit due to double
75. See iU.
76. See Nicholas Economides, The Incentivefor Non-Price [sic] Discriminationby an
Input Monopolist, 16 INT'LJ. INDUS. ORG. 271 (1998).
77. See id at 281.

78. See id.
79. See id.
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marginalization.' ° Full vertical integration gives the BOC the requisite
control to effect as much sabotage as it desires with no harm to its own
long-distance sales. Thus, the conclusion that BOCs will unambiguously
sabotage until the long-distance market is foreclosed.8 '
T. Randolph Beard, David L. Kaserman, and John W. Mayo change
Economides model by introducing "mildly differentiated" long-distance
products, a "competitive fringe" faced by BOCs in the provision of access
services, and price rather than quantity competition for long-distance
services. 82 However, they impose an assumption that aggregate longdistance demand is invariant to prices. 3 Aside from the strong empirical
evidence that this is incorrect, this assumption eliminates the very reason
that differentiated long-distance products might matter to a BOC that is
considering whether to engage in sabotage. 84 Under this assumption, there
can be no lost sales if all rivals are driven out of the market and,
predictably, Beard, Kaserman, and Mayo conclude that BOCs have
incentives to engage in sabotage as long as the access competition is not
too intense.
Economides extends his analysis to the case of heterogeneous
efficiency between
S86 the BOC and its rivals in the production of longdistance services. As expected, his basic conclusion does not change if
the BOC is more efficient than its rivalsY Remarkably, however,
Economides concludes that the BOC will engage in market-foreclosing
sabotage even if the BOC is less efficient than its rivals in the production
of long-distance services-no matter how much less efficient.8 As a
general theoretical matter, this conclusion cannot be correct because, as
explained above, if the BOC is so inefficient that it can capture more of the
long-distance profit through access charges than it can generate by
producing the long-distance service itself, then the BOC does not want to
sabotage its rivals. That is, even in Economides model, which assumes
homogeneous long-distance products, completely costless sabotage for the
BOC due to the constant returns in long-distance production, fullyintegrated BOC, and positive profit margins in both the access and long80. See id.

81. See id.
82. Beard, supra note 55, at 11-12.

83. See Id. at 13.
84. See LESTER D.
143 (1994).

TAYLOR, TELFCOMMUNICATIONS DEMAND IN THEORY AND PRACriCE

85. See Beard, supra note 55, at 24.
86. See Econormides, supra note 76, at 281.

87. See id.
88. See id.
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distance markets, if the BOC's efficiency disadvantage is large enough,
then the incentive to sabotage disappears.89 Thus, whether the BOC has
incentive to sabotage rivals is an empirical matter that depends, among
other things, on the relative efficiency of the BOC and its rivals. Dennis L.
Weisman explicitly studies the case of a relatively inefficient BOC and
presents various scenarios in which the BOC may choose not to engage in
sabotage. 9 He finds that the BOC must be substantially less efficient than
its rivals before the incentive to sabotage disappears and that this critical
level of inefficiency increases as regulatory oversight becomes imperfect. 9'
Another paper by Weisman incorporates differentiated long-distance
products, a cost of carrying out sabotage, potentially increasing marginal
cost of long-distance, and potentially heterogeneous long-distance costs?2
With all of these complications, Weisman finds the BOC facing a tradeoff
between access profits and long-distance profits, making the degree of
sabotage less severe than in the Economides model. 93 Whether sabotage is
costly, as assumed by Weisman, is challenged by David Reiffen. 94 Reiffen
suggests sabotage may be carried out by degrading service, so that a BOC
actually saves money by engaging in sabotage.95 Weisman counters that the
savings may be small compared to the cost of supplying different levels of
service for the BOC and its rivals.9
In two papers, David S. Sibley and Dennis L. Weisman assume
homogeneous long-distance products and sabotage that is carried out
without cost to the BOC. The first paper further assumes constant and
97
homogeneous marginal cost of long-distance and a fully-integrated BOC.
In this framework, they study the incentive to engage in a small amount of
sabotage and find that when BOC long-distance market share is low there
is no incentive to conduct the first unit of sabotage because it causes lost
89. See generally Mandy, supra note 62 (identifying and analyzing the key industry

characteristics that determine whether nonprice discrimination is likely).
90. See Dennis L. Weisman, Vertical Integration and Exclusionary Behavior in
Network Industries 1-3 (Jan. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Federal
CommunicationsLaw Journal).
91. See id,
92. See Dennis L. Weisman, Regulation and the Vertically IntegratedFirm: The Case
of RBOC Entry into InterLATA Long-distance, 8 3 REG. ECON. 249,250 (1995).

93. See id,at 261-62.
94. See David Reiffen, A Regulated Finn's Incentive to Discriminate:A Reevaluation
and Extension of Weisman's Result, 14 . REG. ECON. 79,79-80 (1998).
95. See id.
96. See Dennis L. Weisman, The Incentive to Discriminate by a Vertically Integrated
RegulatedFirm:A Reply, 143. REG. ECON. 87, 88 (1998).

97. See David S. Sibley & Dennis L. Weisman, The Competitive Incentives of Vertically
Integrated Local Exchange Carriers: An Economic and Policy Analysis, 17 J. PoL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 74,74-93 (1998).
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access profit, and due to the low market share, does not generate much
long-distance profit.98 Sibley and Weisman estimate the critical market
share, above which the BOC benefits from sabotage, to be about twentyone percent on average. 99 However, their paper does not address the
optimal choice of sabotage when the degree of sabotage can be large.
The second paper focuses on severely increasing marginal cost of
long-distance production in the form of BOC capacity constraints, which
introduces both decreasing returns in long-distance production and
° Like Economides, the analysis
heterogeneous costs across firms.'O
presented by Sibley and Weisman allows any choice of sabotage.' 1 The
capacity constraints in this paper are one rationale for the assumed market
share in the first paper.'0 Analogous to the first paper, Sibley and Weisman
find that when BOC capacity is low there is no incentive for the BOC to
sabotage because the BOC has no productive capability to fulfill its rivals'
lost sales. 0 3 In fact, under very severe capacity constraints the BOC may
want to engage in reverse sabotage, if possible, by reducing its rivals'
costs. Sibley and Weisman permit the BOC to acquire capacity over time
and again find that once its share of the long-distance market exceeds about
one-fourth the incentives shift in favor of sabotage.' 4
These papers point out another distinction between today and the
predivestiture period. BOCs currently have no market share in interLATA
long-distance; and, according to the Sibley/Weisman analysis, the BOCs'
immediate incentive upon entry into this market does not involve sabotage,
even if long-distance products are homogeneous, sabotage is free, costs are
homogenous across firms up to the capacity constraint, and BOCs are fully
integrated.'05 How long this happy state of affairs lasts depends on how
quickly BOCs acquire market share. Experience with GTE and Southern
New England Telephone (SNET) suggests that Sibley and Weisman's
critical twenty-five percent level can be achieved by an Incumbent Local
Exchange Carrier (JLEC) about two years after entry, but it is unclear
whether this rapid growth will persist once multiple CLECs are
simultaneously competing.' 6
98. See id. at 87.
99. See id.
100. See David S. Sibley & Dennis L. Weisman, Raising Rivals' Costs: The Entry of an
UpstreamMonopolist into DownstreamMarkets, 10 INFO. ECON. & PoL'Y 451 (1998).
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See iL
104. Seeid. at461.
105. See id. at 459.
106. See Testimony of Alfred E. Kahn & Timothy J.Tardiff at 63, Application of SBC
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It is also unclear whether the cost of sabotage is significant enough to
largely preclude it. In the sabotage models, access charges that are above
access costs are the main source of tradeoff for the BOC. °7 Thus, such
charges discourage sabotage and, without them, the only policy factors
working to discourage sabotage would be the cost of carrying out sabotage
and the structural separation requirements between the BOC and its longdistance subsidiary. Some argue that access charges above cost are an
impediment to long-distance competition because they give BOCs a cost
advantage in the long-distance market."" Although consumer welfare from
long-distance sales would still be enhanced by the entry-provided there is
no sabotage-in extreme cases, this might result in BOCs' interLATA
entry and completely foreclose the long-distance market to other suppliers.
Total welfare in the long-distance market would also certainly be higher
without inflated access charges than with them and higher still with both
cost-based access charges and a BOC in the market that conducts no
sabotage. But the incentive for sabotage is higher in this setting and the
regulatory controls on sabotage would have to be correspondingly elevated
to bring this outcome to fruition. To the extent that access charges above
costs discourage sabotage, such charges paradoxically encourage longdistance competition. This is not an argument for maintaining high access
charges, since as with any price that differs from marginal cost, such
charges create welfare losses.
Given the incentives created by the existing level of access profits, in
order to prevent sabotage, regulators' and legislators' monitoring and
penalty structures must be aggressive enough to make the expected penalty
from sabotage severe enough to deter it. Thus, as access profits decrease,
regulatory monitoring of sabotage must become more vigilant. As
discussed below, some provisions of the Act and the FCC's Orders are
directly intended to accomplish this goal.' 9 However, even if these
provisions are imperfect and allow some sabotage to occur, the
improvement in consumer welfare from enhanced interLATA competition
may more than offset the losses from sabotage and interLATA entry may
still enhance consumer welfare. According to some estimates, a BOC's
sabotage would need to be substantial enough to increase its rivals' costs
by at least seventy-two percent before producing a negative net effect on

Comm. Inc., S.W. Bell Tel. Co., & S.W. Bell Comm. Servs., Inc. for Provision of In-region,
InterLATA Servs. in Mo. (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Nov. 20, 1998) (No. TO-99-227).

107. See generallyMandy, supra note 62.
108. See Access Charge Reform, FirstReport and Order,12 F.C.C.R. 15,982, para. 275,
7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1209 (1997) [hereinafter Access Reform Order].
109. See infraPart VI.B.
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consumer welfare." ° This estimate suggests that monitoring and penalty
structures need only be capable of detecting substantialsabotage in order
to assure that BOCs interLATA entry is beneficial for consumers.
Two papers that address the question of whether access charges above
cost are an impediment to long-distance competition are Franklin M. Fisher
and Paul J. Hinton."' These papers study the effects of access charges
alone, assuming no explicit BOC efforts to further raise rivals' costs." 2
Fisher assumes homogeneous long-distance products, constant marginal
cost of long-distance production, and a fully-integrated BOC."3 He
concludes that there is a potential welfare loss from interLATA entry by a
BOC if the BOC is a less-efficient provider of long-distance
O "114 than its rivals
because access charges are indisputably above access costs. If aggregate
long-distance volume is fixed, the BOC prefers to substitute its own longdistance service for its rivals' services as long as the price in the longdistance market is above the BOC's marginal cost of long-distance service
plus the BOC's profit margin on access." 5 Based on these considerations,
when the BOC enters the interLATA market, the total cost of producing a
given volume of long-distance services is increased because a high-cost
producer has partially replaced lower-cost producers. Note, however, only
profit decreases. Consumer welfare is unchanged as long as the longdistance price and, hence, volume is unchanged. The BOC entry will
actually cause long-distance prices to drop, thereby expanding volume and
increasing consumer welfare. The BOC must then tradeoff the lower price
against the higher share of long-distance profits it receives on the units it
directly sells plus the double marginalization savings from higher volumes
and, based on this tradeoff, choose an appropriate scale of entry. In this
case, the effect on total welfare is ambiguous since consumer welfare
increases while total profit decreases. But, if the focus is on consumer
welfare from long-distance consumption, then the BOC interLATA entry is
clearly beneficial." 6
Hinton further studies the Fisher proposition that the BOC interLATA
110. See MacAvoy, supra note 4, at 7.
111. See Franklin M. Fisher, An Analysis of Switched Access Pricing and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Federal
CommunicationsLaw Journal).
112. See id.
113. See id

114. See Hinton, supra note 4, at 184.
115. See Affidavit of Paul S.Brandon & Richard L. Schmalensee at 38-41, Application
by SBC Comm. Inc., S.W. Bell Tel. Co., and S.W. Bell Comm. Servs., Inc. for Provision of

In-region, InterLATA Servs. in Mo. (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Nov. 20, 1998) (No. TO-99227).
116. SeeicLat4l-43.
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entry may decrease total welfare, even though consumer welfare is
enhanced."7 They conduct numerical simulations that-for realistic ranges
of parameter values-show total welfare always increases more when the
BOC entry is integrated with its local service rather than performed by a
separate affiliate, as required by the Act. 1 8 Hence, the Fisher proposition is
theoretically possible, but quite unlikely." 9
Of course, since the possibility of raising rivals' costs beyond the
access charge is not modeled in the Fisher and Hinton papers, a main
motivation for a separate affiliate is not present in these models. As a
result, the Hinton finding that a separate affiliate harms welfare must be
viewed with some skepticism. Sibley, Weisman, and Economides extend
their models to the case of a separate BOC subsidiary that provides longdistance service."n Sibley and Weisman find that the incentive to sabotage
may disappear if a separate affiliate works as intended by completely
separating the decision making of the local and long-distance parts of a
BOC and preventing favorable terms on transactions between the BOC and
its affiliate.' 2' This follows because the market share of such an affiliate
may never reach the critical level at which sabotage becomes profitable.
Economides's version of a separate subsidiary treats sabotage as affecting
all long-distance sellers, including the BOC's afflliate.'2 He finds that the
incentive to sabotage disappears because the only gain from sabotage
occurs when it is applied disproportionately to rivals, shifting more of the
long-distance market to the BOC and enabling the BOC to reap more of the
long-distance profit than it can get through its fixed access charge. If a
BOC's interLATA service is offered through Economides's separate
subsidiary that subsidiary suffers from any sabotage just like the BOC's
rivals, and the effect on the parent company is lower access profits due to
ubiquitously higher long-distance costs which drive down long-distance
volume.
As with tying, the group of policies designed to introduce competition
into the market for local exchange service reduces incentives to raise
rivals' costs.' The logic for this is simply that if there are alternative
sellers of local access that can be used by interexchange carriers (IXCs),
then BOCs must offer a competitive, relatively unsabotaged, access

117. See Hinton, supra note 4, at 185-86.
118. Seeid.at 189.
119. Seeid.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See Sibley & Weisman, supranote 100; Economides, supranote 76.
See Sibley & Weisman, supranote 100, at 464.
See Economides, supranote 76, at 281.
See Beard, supra note 55, at 22-23.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52

product or risk losing their access customers. Competitive Access
Providers (CAPs) are an example of this outcome. Competition for local
exchange service may only shift the motives for sabotage from IXCs to
CLECs. As mentioned above, the incentives for this type of sabotage are
not well understood because the existing literature does not address this
case very explicitly. To the extent there are incentives for this type of
sabotage, however, the solution remains to make sabotage costly through
regulatory oversight.
C.

CreatingIncentives to Reduce Entry Barriersinto the Local
Exchange Business

The third and last economic argument against BOCs' entry into longdistance is that the "carrot" of permitting BOCs to serve interLATA
markets must be held out to provide incentives for BOCs to reduce barriers
to entry into the local exchange business. Such barriers may be either
natural or intentionally erected by BOCs; but in either case, BOCs are
viewed as possessing unique abilities to reduce them. As mentioned above,
Beard, Kaserman, and Mayo find that more intense competition in the local
exchange market can eliminate incentives for sabotage.'2As already noted,
enhanced competition for local exchange service may also reduce
undesirable motives for tying. Consequently, there are direct reasons to
link interLATA entry to the presence of local competition. Paradoxically,
the incentives are bidirectional-tying and sabotage should both encourage
local competition as IXCs seek ways to circumvent any such BOC
behavior.
On the other hand, holding out this carrot carries a cost in the form of
delayed interLATA competition. An indication of the potential magnitude
of lost welfare is given by the Hinton and MacAvoy estimates. These
opportunity costs from delayed long-distance competition continue as long
as the delay continues.'2' Jerry A. Hausman presents a variety of
opportunity cost estimates from past regulatory delays in allowing new
entry and finds that the welfare losses can be very large.' He argues that
these same considerations apply to BOCs' interLATA entry, making it
unwise to continue to block such entry. 27 Some argue that IXCs are
delaying their entry into local markets in order to prevent BOCs from

124. See id.
125. See Hinton, supra note 4, at 189; MacAvoy, supra note 4, at 6.
126. See Jerry A. Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in
Telecommunications, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcnvrrY (MICROECONOMICS) 138 (Martin Neil Bailey et al. eds., 1997).
127. See iL
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meeting either the Track A or Track B requirements.'2 If this is true,
further opportunity costs occur as a result of linking interLATA entry to
local competition. Even if this strategic delay is occurring, its further costs
in local exchange markets may be small because the main immediate
benefit associated with enhanced competition is lower prices, and the
potential for this is limited in at least some parts of local exchange markets
by existing price cap regulation. Of course, if price cap regulation were
bringing all the benefits of competition to the local exchange, there would
be no reason to encourage competition. To the extent that local exchange
competition is beneficial, any strategic delay that is occurring must be
creating opportunity costs that are attributable to the policy linking longdistance competition to local competition. The Beard result confirms that
price cap regulation does not in fact bring all the benefits of competition to
the local exchange market because the regulation does not eliminate
incentives for sabotage.'2
Aside from these arguments for and against the policy of inducing
BOCs to reduce entry barriers by holding out the promise of interLATA
entry, creating incentives for local exchange competition is valuable for the
same basic reason that allowing BOCs entry into interLATA markets is
valuable: Free and open competition brings about the lowest possible
prices and the mix of services that is most closely aligned with consumers'
preferences. In the case of local competition, there is the nagging doubt
that free and open competition may not be efficient because the market
might still be a natural monopoly-served at least cost by only one
supplier.' 30 However, the Act's requirements concerning unbundling and
resale recognize this possibility by creating wholesale markets for
telecommunications services so that robust competition can exist at the
retail level even if there is little competition at the facilities level. But in
this case, facilities-based competition will not be widespread. This
possibility diminishes the incentives for reducing entry barriers in markets
for local exchange service, at least partly because of the FCC's
interpretation of Track B, which is addressed in the next part.

IMI. CONTENTIOUS ISSUES INTHE SECTION 271 ORDERS
This part discusses six issues that have been prominent in the FCC's

128. See Duane Ackerman, Why IsAT&TAfraid to Compete?, WALL ST. ., July 3, 1997,

atA10.
129. See Beard, supranote 55, at 22-23.

130. This is not well established and is independent of the fact that BOCs are no longer
franchise monopolies. Natural monopoly is defined by cost relative to demand, not by the
presence or absence of a legal franchise.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNVAL

[Vol. 52

six extant Orders concerning interLATA entry and in other policy arenas.
The first is the interpretation of the Track A and B requirements. The
second is access to the Unbundled Network Element (UNE) known as
Operational Support Systems (OSS). The third is interconnection, while the
fourth is access to the local transport and local switching UNEs, and the
CLEC's ability to combine UNEs. The fifth is the FCC's pricing rules,
while the last is the FCC's pick and choose rule.
A.

Track A andB Requirements

Section 271(c)(1)(A) of the Act provides that a BOC meets the first
condition for interLATA entry
[I]f it has entered into one or more binding agreements... specifying
the terms and conditions under which the [BOC] is providing access
and interconnection... for.., one or more unaffiliated competing
providers of telephone exchange service... to residential and business
subscribers. [S]uch telephone exchange service may be offered by such
competing providers either exclusively over their own... facilities or
predominantly over their own... facilities in combination with...
resale ....
Alternatively, section 271(c)(1)(B) provides that a BOC also meets
the first condition for interLATA entry if
[N]o such provider has requested the access and interconnection
described in subparagraph (A) ...and a statement of the terms and
conditions that the [Bell operating] company generally offers to
provide such access and interconnection has been approved or
permitted to take effect by the State commission .. 132
These are the only requirements that the FCC ruled on in the 1997
Order affecting SBC Communications, Inc.'s application in Oklahoma
(Oklahoma Order).33 Most of the Oklahoma Order is devoted to
determining whether these requirements are met.'1 Ultimately, the FCC
determined that Brooks Fiber was not a "competing provider" because,
even though Brooks and Southwestern Bell had entered into an agreement
specifying terms and conditions for access and interconnection of both
residential and business subscribers, Brooks was not at that time actually
selling services to residential subscribers.'35 The FCC adopted the
interpretation that, to be a "competing provider," a company must be "an

131. 47 U.S.C. § 271 (c)(1)(A) (Supp. H 1996).
132. Id.
§ 271(c)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1996).
133. See Oklahoma Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 8685, para. 1, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 198
(1997).
134. See id.
135. See id. at par. 17.
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actual commercial alternative" to the BOC. 36 In this interpretation,
"competing" is the operative word. The FCC decided that a company could
not be competing unless it was actually offering its services for sale.' 37 The
same type of active interpretation could be placed on the phrase "is
providing," although the FCC did not do so. It could be argued that a BOC
is providing access and interconnection only if the CLEC is actually
buying and using the BOC's access and interconnection services. If
Congress meant otherwise, the wording would be "has agreed to provide."
Given the consistent use of active wording in the Track A subparagraph,
the FCC's interpretation seems consistent with the Act.
The FCC then decided that a "qualifying request" for Track B had
occurred because, even though no provider was actually selling residential
local exchange service at that time, requests for access and interconnection
had been made that would satisfy Track A if implemented. 38 Much
discussion is devoted to supporting this interpretation of Track B, since this
interpretation means that the reference "such provider" can be to either an
actual or potential competitor, in contrast to the interpretation of Track Athat the provider must be "an actual commercial alternative."' 139 The FCC
argues that its double meaning of provider is necessary for Track B to
make sense because, to be an actual commercial alternative, a CLEC must
have already requested access and interconnection. In other words, no
provider that is an actual commercial alternative can request access and
interconnection. Hence, if such provider in Track B is the competing
provider of Track A, then it would be impossible for a request to ever be
received from such provider.'40 Other justifications offered by the FCC
(such as the strict requirement that a provider in subparagraph B be the
actual commercial alternative of subparagraph A) would create incentives
read some
for BOCs to delay interconnection agreements and would 141
statute.
the
of
out
B
subparagraph
in
later
mentioned
exceptions
This interpretation of the Track A and B requirements was the sole
factor in the FCC's Order denying Southwestern Bell's application. The
FCC failed to address many items of interest, including: (1) whether
Brooks was at least a competing provider to business subscribers; (2) what
constitutes predominantly facilities-based; (3) whether the predominantly
facilities-based standard applies separately to residential and business
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at para. 14.
SeeiL atpara. 17.
See id. at para. 27.
Id. atpara. 14.
See id. at paras. 33-53.
See iL at para. 29.
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subscribers or only in the aggregate; (4) whether the requirement that
CLEC service be offered to both residential and business subscribers
applies to individual CLECs or only in the aggregate; and (5) whether there
are minimal levels of geographic and market share penetration that must be
achieved before a CLEC is an actual commercial alternative. Moreover, the
FCC made no evaluation of whether Southwestern Bell met the checklist,
separate affiliate, and public interest requirements.
Following denial of the application, SBC contested the Oklahoma
142
Order.
SBC argued that the FCC effectively closed Track B through its
interpretation of the Act.14' The FCC defended its position by arguing that
the statute's omission of the word "competing" between "such" and
"provider" differentiated the requirements of Track A from those of Track
44 The court ruled
B.'
that "it is not apparent on their face whether 'such
provider' in Track B is intended to mean a carrier who has met the
requirements of Track A."' 45 Due to this ambiguity in the wording of the
legislation, the court upheld the FCC's Order by following the standards
set in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.'46
The ruling concluded by stating that Congress "clearly gave the [FCC] the
primary responsibility to make delicate judgments" similar to those in
question. 47 Therefore, the FCC should be free to perform that task as long
as it acts in good faith.
Bearing this in mind, the FCC's Track B interpretation still presents
some difficulties in that it requires
a judgment on whether implementation
S• 148
of agreements is proceeding. Otherwise, a CLEC could foreclose BOC
interLATA entry by simply not becoming a predominantly facilities-based
actual commercial alternative for both residential and business subscribers,
but potentially being such a provider by virtue of an agreement specifying
interconnection terms for such services. There is an exception in
subparagraph B specifying that no request has been received from a CLEC
if the state commission determines the CLEC failed to meet an
implementation schedule contained in its agreement with the BOC.149 This
seems to indicate that judgments about implementation are up to state
142. See SBC Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 138 F.3d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
143. See id. at 417.
144. See id. at 416.
145. Id. at418.
146. 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (requiring the court to defer to the FCC's interpretation of the
ambiguous test as long as it is a permissible reading).
147. SBC Comm., Inc., 138 F.3d at 421.
148. See Oklahoma Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 8685, para. 58, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 198
(1997).
149. See 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. HI 1996).
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commissions. This does not, however, address cases in which an agreement
does not contain an implementation schedule, even though many
agreements do not. Recognizing this, the FCC adopted a "reasonable steps"
criterion-not contained in the Act-to judge implementation made
necessary by its interpretation of Track B. However, in its first Order, the
new commission under Chairman Kennard backed away from the
reasonable steps criterion.' 0
Specifically, in the Order addressing BellSouth's application in South
Carolina (South Carolina Order), the FCC emphasized reasonable steps
between an initial and subsequent reapplication in a particular state,
suggesting that a BOC may not be able to argue that an initial application
qualifies under Track B on the basis that reasonable steps toward
implementation have not occurred. 5 ' The FCC also opined in the South
Carolina Order that it may be more efficient to seek state commission
certification that CLECs have not met implementation schedules than to
judge whether reasonable steps have been taken toward implementation. 52
Hence, the FCC's interpretation of Track B and the reasonable steps
criterion places great importance on implementation schedules, making
such schedules the weapon available to BOCs to avoid being foreclosed
from interLATA entry.'
Unfortunately, neither BOCs nor state
commissions anticipated the importance of the schedules. In fact, many
agreements, including some that were arbitrated, simply do not contain
implementation schedules even though the Act specifically requires that
arbitrated agreements contain such schedules.'4
In Ameritech's application in Michigan (Michigan Order), the FCC
addressed some of the questions surrounding Track A compliance that it
had left unanswered in the Oklahoma Order.'5 s In particular, the FCC
determined that: (1) Brooks, WFS, and TCG are all competing providers in
the sense that they are actual commercial alternatives to the BOC; (2)
Brooks is exclusively facilities-based because it uses only its own
equipment and Ameritech's UNEs, which the FCC determined were a
CLEC's own facilities for purposes of Track A compliance; (3) the
requirement that CLEC service be offered to both residential and business
subscribers applies in the aggregate; (4) there is no minimal level of
150. See OklahomaOrder, 12 F.C.C.R. 8685, para. 58, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 198.

151. See South CarolinaOrder, 13 F.C.C.R. 539, para. 61, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 870
(1998).
152. See id. atpara. 64.

153. See id.
154. See id. at para. 64 (The South Carolina commission arbitrated this, but it does not
contain an implementation schedule); 47 U.S.C. §252(c)(3) (Supp. 11996).
155. See Michigan Order,12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, 9 Comm. Reg. (P &F) 267 (1997).
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geographic penetration that must be achieved before a CLEC is an actual
commercial alternative; (5) there is no minimal market share that must be
achieved before a CLEC is an actual commercial alternative, but a de
minimis number of access lines, as possessed by Brooks, MFS, and TCG,
is required; and (6) every checklist item need not be in every
interconnection agreement, and BOCs need not be actually furnishing
every checklist item in order to satisfy the competitive checklist.'m The
finding on market share is inconclusive, since no specific meaning of de
minimis has been given for this context. The finding on checklist
items is
consistent with a reading of the Act that carefully interprets the
requirement that BOCs either "fully implement" the checklist or "offer"
every checklist item through an SGAT. Otherwise, the application may be
inconsistent with section 271(d)(3)(A), which contains the 'fully
implement" or "offer" language.'5 Finally, because the FCC determined
that Brooks was exclusively facilities-based in Michigan, the FCC neither
provided a definition of "predominantly" nor determined whether it applies
to business and residential services separately. In finding that Bell Atlantic
satisfied the Track A requirements in New York, the FCC ruled "that
AT&T, MCI WorldCom, and Cablevision Lightpath provide telephone
exchange service either exclusively or predominantly over their own
facilities to residential and to business subscribers." 58 However, the agency
still neither defined "predominantly" nor evaluated whether it applies to
business and residential services separately."
The FCC's interpretation of Track B has the potential to slow the
introduction of competition into both the local exchange and interLATA
markets. Since the FCC based all other denials, at least in part, on checklist
noncompliance, to date, this interpretation has only explicitly resulted in a
denial in Oklahoma. There may be implicit effects on both BOC and CLEC
strategies toward the local exchange and interLATA markets that are
ultimately more important than any explicit effects. Moreover, given the
checklist issues that have arisen in other states, it seems likely that the
Oklahoma application would not have passed a serious review of checklist
compliance. Consider the situation in which a BOC has satisfied the
checklist and structural requirements. Under the FCC's interpretation, even
though all of the market-opening directives that the Act imposes on the
BOC have been accomplished, interLATA entry still cannot be granted
156. See id. at paras. 76-78, 82, 101-102. Congress considered, and explicitly rejected,
the use of a market share test for determining whether local exchange markets are open.
Whether the de minimis standard for an "actual commercial alternative" is consistent with
this legislative history is an open question. I&a
at para. 27.

157. 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(A) (Supp. 1 1996).
158. New York Order,FCC 99-404, 1999 WL 1243135, para. 62 (Dec. 22, 1999).
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unless either: (1) there are CLECs that have binding access and
interconnection agreements with the BOC, which need not include
implementation schedules for the CLECs; are actual commercial
alternatives to the BOC, meaning that the CLECs need not be everywhere
in the state but that they must have a vague de minimis number of access
lines; are collectively serving both residential and business subscribers; and
are predominantly facility-or UNE-based, where "predominantly" has yet
to be defined in terms of either its separate or joint application to
residential and business customers, or its aggregate meaning; or (2) every
CLEC that has requested access or interconnection can be placed into one
of two groups-those who have violated an implementation schedule or
have negotiated in bad faith, as certified by the state commission or those
for whom the BOC can demonstrate that the requested access and
interconnection, when implemented, will not satisfy item one.
If the BOC cannot establish item one as a general matter, then
interLATA entry cannot be grantedif there is even one CLEC for whom
the BOC is unable to persuade the state commission of an implementation
or negotiation violation, or for whom the BOC is unable to persuade the
FCC that the requested access and interconnection will ultimately fail to
satisfy item one. This is unrealistic. In South Carolina, it means BellSouth
needed either a failed negotiation/implementation certification from the
South Carolina Commission, or a preponderance of evidence before the
FCC that an agreement would not satisfy Track A even if implemented,for
each of eighty-three separate CLECs."'

Given the hopelessness of this task, it is an open question whether
BOCs feel a real incentive to reduce entry barriers in local exchange
markets. The only actions that seem clearly destined to move BOCs closer
to interLATA entry are those that help satisfy item one as a general matter.
Those same actions subject BOCs to competition from CLECs that may
not satisfy item one if, for example, CLECs serve only high-profit business
subscribers, serve residential subscribers only through resale, or maintain a
low enough facilities/UNE presence that the predominant standard is not
met. In principle, the BOC recourse in such circumstances is to pursue item
two. This would be an exceptionally lengthy and contentious process and
would be doomed to fail if there was even one CLEC for whom no firm
implementation schedule was negotiated or who had just recently made a
broad request for access and interconnection but for whom insufficient
time had passed to address whether implementation was proceeding as
promised.

159. See South CarolinaOrder,13 F.C.C.R. 539, para. 65, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 870.
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It is not clear that the lengthy approach outlined in item two is
necessary for a Track B application according to the Act because the
exceptions contained in section 271(c)(1)(B) are never described in the
statute as the only mechanisms for Track B. The FCC characterizes them in
the Michigan Order as the only available avenue for Track B

compliance. 16 As in Oklahoma, failure to meet the Track B requirements
was one of the reasons for the FCC denial in South Carolina (Track A

requirements also were not met for essentially the same reasons given in
the Oklahoma Order)." Notably, neither BellSouth in Louisiana nor Bell
Atlantic in New York pursued Track B in its reapplication.'

B.

Access to OSS

In the Michigan Order, South Carolina Order, Louisiana Order,
BellSouth's second application attempt in Louisiana (LouisianaII Order),
and the New York Order, the FCC evaluated compliance with certain

checklist items, even though this was not strictly necessary in South
Carolina since a determination was made that neither Track A nor Track B
were met.' 63 Checklist item (ii) requires "Nondiscriminatory access to
network elements in accordance with the requirements of sections

251(c)(3) and 252(d)(1)," and the Act requires for approval an FCC finding
that the checklist has either been "fully implemented" through
interconnection agreements or "fully offered" through a SGAT.' 4 The
FCC's 1996 Order addressing the implementation of local competition
provisions (Local Competition Order), in turn, defined OSS as a UNE,16
thereby requiring that BOCs provide OSS access in accordance with
checklist item (ii). This part of the Local Competition Orderwas upheld by
the Eighth Circuit in Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC, but was subsequently
vacated by the Supreme Court, which ruled that the FCC had not given

160. See Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, para. 112,9 Comm. Reg. (P &F) 267.
161. See Oklahoma Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 8685, para. 20, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 198
(1997).
162. See New York Order, FCC 99-404, 1999 WI.. 1243135, par. 62; Louisiana II
Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 20,599, 13 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1082 (1998).
163. See New York Order, FCC 99-404, 1999 WL 1243135, para. 62; Louisiana II
Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 20,599, 13 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1082; Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R.
20,543, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267; South CarolinaOrder, 13 F.C.C.R. 539, para. 65, 10
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 870; LouisianaOrder, 13 F.C.C.R. 6245, 11 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 328
(1998).
164. 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B) (Supp. II 1996) (referencing checklist items); see id. §
271(d)(3)(A) (Supp. I11996).
165. See Implementation of Local Competition Provisions of the Telecomms. Act of
1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, para. 526, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1
(1996) [hereinafter Local Competition Order];47 C.F.R. § 51.319 (1998).
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substance to the statutory requirements that the agency consider whether
access to a UNE that is proprietaryis necessary and whether lack of access
would impairCLECs.' The FCC's position that OSS is indeed a UNE that
meets the Act's "necessary" and "impairment!' standards was subsequently
restated in the UNE Order.'67 The FCC has defined OSS as the various
systems used for "pre-ordering [sic], ordering, provisioning, maintenance
and repair, and billing of [UNEs] and resold services." '68
In all three states the BOC made certain computer systems available
to CLECs. However, these systems typically required that customer
information keyed in as part of a customer inquiry (i.e., preordering) be
rekeyed to place an actual order. This could lead to transcription errors,
extra personnel time, and phone numbers or dates for service activation
being different from what a CLEC told its customer during their initial
inquiry. Moreover, the systems did not always relay problems with an
order back to the CLEC as quickly as similar problems would be identified
for the BOC. In fact, in some cases, they relied on manual handling and
faxing of documents. In contrast, most of these activities are supported
with a seamless electronic system for BOCs' own customers.
Similarly, the FCC argued that the OSS made available for ordering
UNEs, maintenance and repair functions, and billing were inadequate or
their adequacy was insufficiently documented.' 69 As discussed in Part ]3i.D,
BellSouth did not provide a method for ordering combinations of UNEs
and did not document that the level of manual intervention was
appropriate. 70 BellSouth only offered manual ordering methods for
complicated orders.' Likewise, certain maintenance and repair problems
could not be handled electronically in Louisiana, and some usage
measurement data that are needed for customer billing were not being
provided to CLECs 72
The FCC concluded that this constitutes discriminatory access to the
166. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(d) (Supp. II 1996); Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th
Cir. 1997), aff'd inpartand rev'd in part,525 U.S. 366 (1999); AT&T Corp.v. Iowa Utils.
Bd., 119 S. CL 1022 (1999) (vacating "Rule 319" of 47 U.S.C. § 52 because the FCC failed
to adequately interpret the Act's "necessary" and "impairment" standards); see also infra
Part M.D.
167. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecomms. Act of
1996, Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC
99-238, 1999 WL 1008985, paras. 424,433 (1999) [hereinafter UNE Order].
168. Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, para. 525,4 Comm. Reg. (P & F)1.
169. See Louisiana IIOrder, 13 F.C.C.R. 20,599, paras. 136-44, 149, 154-55, 157, 160,

13 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1082 (1998).
170. See id.
atparas. 138, 141.
171. See id.
172. See id.
at paras. 149-57, 159-60.
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OSS UNE and used this as a basis for denial in all four Orders. 73 Although
both Ameritech and BellSouth argued that their systems provide access to
basic OSS functionality, neither was able to establish that the access was
truly nondiscriminatory. Hence, the FCC decision appears consistent with
the Act and also with the objective of reducing barriers to entry into the
local exchange market.
The importance attached to OSS is clearly displayed in the New York
Order, where the FCC devotes 88 of 226 pages to an extremely detailed
analysis of whether Bell Atlantic's OSS meets the statutory
requirements.' 74 Overall, the FCC found that Bell Atlantic met the statutory
requirement for OSS because of its service delivery evidenced by
numerous performance measures, the involvement of the New York Public
Service Commission, and the independent third party review of KPMG.'7 5
In particular, the FCC describes the tests performed by KPMG as "broad in
scope," "independent and blind, and "persuasive evidence."' 76
C.

Interconnection

Checklist item (i) requires "[i]nterconnection in accordance with the
requirements of sections 251(c)(2) and 252(d)(1)," and section 251(c)(2) of
the Act requires interconnection "that is at least equal in quality to that
provided by the local exchange carrier to itself."' In the Michigan Order,
the FCC discusses an interconnection dispute between Ameritech and its
rivals over "trunk blocking," which is essentially the failure to carry a
signal over a trunk between end offices and/or tandem switches.'78 The
allegation is that the percentage of calls that Ameritech's trunks failed to
carry was higher for rivals than for Ameritech. 79 Ameritech disputed this
and offered explanations, but ultimately the FCC decided that
interconnection could not be equal in quality if trunk blocking rates were
substantially different and used this as a basis for denial in Michigan." °
This is a sensible interpretation that seems consistent with the Act and with
173. See Louisiana Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 6245, pam. 22, 11 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 328
(1998); LouisianaIHOrder, 13 F.C.C.R. 20,599, para. 91, 13 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1082;
Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, par. 204, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267 (1997); South
CarolinaOrder, 13 F.C.C.R. 539, para. 87, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 870 (1998).
174. See New York Order, FCC 99-404, 1999 WL 1243135, paras. 82-228 (Dec. 22,

1999).
175. See id.
176. See id. at paras. 97, 99-100.

177. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2) (Supp. II 1996).
178. See Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, paras. 222-55, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
267.
179. See id.
at para. 240.
180. See id. at para.224.
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reducing entry barriers, since trunk blocking can result in customers' calls
not getting through, which is a direct indicator of quality to consumers.
In Louisiana, the FCC found that BellSouth had committed to a
binding obligation to provide trunks equal in quality, but that comparative
data on actual blocking rates suggested BellSouth was not fulfilling this
obligation." As discussed below, BellSouth's collocation arrangements
were problematic as well because the Louisiana SGAT did not bind
BellSouth to specific installation intervals for interconnection of collocated
equipment and did not state all relevant prices, although some progress on
the reporting of installation intervals occurred between the Louisiana and
LouisianaII applications.82

Chairman Kennard's letter on interconnection (FCCSummary) issued
in response to Senators John McCain and Sam Brownback reiterates that
"the equal in quality obligation.., includes ... quality as perceived by the

requesting telecommunications carrier.'
Arguably, this is a stronger
interpretation than the requirement in the Michigan Order of equal trunk
blocking rates because it allows CLECs to define what constitutes equal
quality rather than simply requiring that the BOC provide "interconnection
equivalent to the interconnection it provides itself."' 84 Conversely,
requiring equal quality only at the consumer level could create a situation
in which the interconnection is awkward and costly for the CLEC even
though these problems are unobservable to consumers. Rather than
addressing this possibility through the equal in quality requirement, it
might be preferable to rely on section 251(c)(2) of the Act, which requires
that interconnection be provided "on rates, terms, and conditions that are
just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory."'' 15 This would avoid giving undue
weight to either consumers' or CLECs' definition of "equal quality."
In the New York Order, the FCC found that Bell Atlantic's
interconnection satisfied the statutory requirements precisely because Bell
Atlantic's performance measures, agreements, and collocation offerings
demonstrated that Bell Atlantic had overcome the problems encountered in
Michigan and Louisiana.'86 In particular, the FCC carefully evaluated
181. See Louisiana 11 Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 20,599, para. 77, 13 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
1082.
182. See id.at paras. 65,72-73,77.
183. Letter from William Kennard, Chairman, FCC, to John McCain & Sam Brownback,
U.S. Senators attachment i-2 (July 16, 1998) [hereinafter FCC Summary] (on file with the
Federal CommunicationsLaw Jounial).
184. Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.RL 20,543, para. 243, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267.
185. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2) (Supp. I 1996).
186. See New York Order, FCC 99-404, 1999 WL 1243135, paras. 63-78 (Dec. 22,
1999).
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whether Bell Atlantic was providing equal-in-quality interconnection that
meets the same technical standards as its own trunking and that is available
at any technically feasible point. 8 7
D.

Unbundled Local TransportandLocal Switching:
Combinations of UNEs

Although not used as a basis for denial, the FCC expressed concern in
the Michigan Order over checklist item (v), which requires BOCs'
provision of "[11ocal transport from the trunk side of a wireline local
exchange carrier switch unbundled from switching or other services," and
checklist item (vi), which requires BOC provision of "[1]ocal switching
unbundled from transport, local loop transmission, or other services."'
Dedicated local transport has been relatively uncontroversial. Rather,
most of the debate has centered on shared local transport. The FCC defined
"shared local transport" as a UNE in the part of the Local Competition
Ordernot vacated by the Eighth Circuit. The FCC reaffirmed its status as a
UNE following the Supreme Court decision to vacate rule 319.'9 There is
no debate over whether Ameritech refused to share local transport as a
UNE with CLECs. Ameritech's shared local transport offerings allowed
CLECs to share a trunk or part of a trunk with each other, but otherwise
treated shared local transport as a resale item. That is, there was no
provision for a CLEC to share a trunk with Ameritech as a UNE."o Hence,
the only possible debate in the Michigan proceeding concerned whether the
shared local transport identified in the Local Competition Order included
sharing with the BOC, or whether the BOC could merely arrange for
CLECs to share with each other. The FCC's final rules required the BOC
to "[pirovide . . . use of the features, functions, and capabilities of
interoffice transmission facilities shared by more than one customer or
carrier,"' 9' which included no exception for sharing with the BOC.
Sharing of trunks at very disaggregated levels certainly provides more
flexibility to the CLEC and thereby reduces entry barriers. According to

187. See id. atparas. 67.
188. Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, paras. 298, 319, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267
(footnotes omitted).
189. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part,525 U.S. 366 (1999); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. CL 1022 (1999) (vacating
"Rule 319" of 47 U.S.C. § 52 because the FCC failed to adequately interpret the Act's
"necessary" and "impairment" standards); see also infra Part II.D.; see also UNE Order,
FCC 99-238, 1999 WL 1008985, paras. 321, 369 (1999).
190. See Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, paras. 311-18, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
267.
191. 47 C.F.R. § 51.319(d)(2)(i) (1998).
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section 252(d)(2), in deciding which elements must be unbundled, the Act
only requires that the FCC consider "whether access to such network
elements as are proprietary in nature is necessary; and [whether] the failure
to provide access to such network elements would impair the ability of the
telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the services that it
seeks to offer."'* In the Local Competition Order,the FCC interpreted the
necessary and impairment standards broadly. Although the Eighth Circuit
upheld this interpretation,'9 the Supreme Court determined that "the Act
requires the FCC to apply some limiting standard, rationally related to the
goals of the Act, which it has simply failed to do."' 95 This was the basis for
the Court's decision to vacate rule 319. A new set of unbundling
requirements that interprets the necessary and impairment standards
resulted in continuing requirements that BOCs share local transport. 196
Rather than contesting the necessity of shared local transport or the lack of
impairment in refusing to share local transport, however, Ameritech argued
that local transport shared with the BOC could not be regarded as a UNE
because it is not a physically distinct element. The FCC rejected this
argument in the Michigan Order, and simultaneously issued a third order
on the implementation of local competition provisions (Third
Reconsideration Order), which unequivocally states the agency's position
that "[tjhe term 'carrier' includes both an incumbent LEC as well as a
requesting telecommunications carrier. We, therefore, conclude that
'shared transport,' as required by the Local Competition Order
encompasses a facility that is shared by multiple carriers, including the
incumbent LEC."' 97 The Supreme Court also rejected the assertion that a
UNE must be physically distinct, concluding that "it is impossible to credit
the incumbents' argument that a 'network element' must be part of the
physical facilities and equipment used to provide local phone service." '
Despite this, Ameritech continued to argue in the UNE Order that shared
transport is not a UNE because it cannot be utilized without local
199
200
switching." As before, the FCC rejected this argument.
192. 47 U.S.C. § 251 (d)(2) (Supp. II 1996).
193. See Local Competition Order,11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, para. 282-85,4 Comm. Reg. (P
&) 1 (1996).
194. See Iowa Utils. Bd, 120 F.3d at 810.
195. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721, 734-35 (1999) (emphasis added).
196. See UNE Order,FCC 99-238, 1999 WL 1008985, paras. 321, 369 (1999).

197. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecomms. Act of
1996, Third Order on Reconsideration and FurtherNotice of Proposed Rulemaking, 12
F.C.C.R. 12,460, para. 22, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1206 (1997) [hereinafter Third
Reconsideration Order].

198. AT&T Corp., 119 S. Ct. at 734.
199. See UNE Order,FCC 99-238, 1999 WL. 1008985, para. 371.
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Several concerns were expressed over Ameritech's local switching.
The first was Ameritech's requirement that a CLEC purchase an entire
trunk-side port with the local switching UNE, rather than allowing only the
part of a shared trunk-side port that the CLEC needs to be purchased as a
separate TJNE." ' In the part of the Local Competition Ordernot vacated by
the Eighth Circuit but ultimately vacated by the Supreme Court, the FCC
defined trunk-side ports as a UNE.m Hence, this issue is the same as the
local transport issue: At what level of disaggregation must BOCs make
their trunk ports and trunks available as UNEs? Although trunk ports are
not specifically discussed in the Third Reconsideration Order, the basic
thrust seems clear. The July 1998 FCC Summary on unbundled local
switching requires BOCs to provide "trunk ports on a shared basis... as
necessary to provide nondiscriminatory access to shared transport
facilities."203 It only makes sense to share local transport if the port
connecting that local transport to the switch is shared as well. The FCC
ultimately made this logic plain in the UNE Order, stating that the "lack of
unbundled access to incumbent's shared transport would impair the
requesting carrier's ability to use unbundled switching."2W Some of this
disagreement between the FCC and Ameritech can be explained by the fact
that the FCC released the Michigan Order and the Third Reconsideration
Order almost simultaneouslyY 5 However, referring to the Local
Competition Order, the FCC is persuasive in pointing out that "a fair
reading of our [Order] and rules does not support the claim advanced by
Ameritech that a shared network element necessarily is shared only among
competitive carriers and is separate from the facility used by the incumbent
LEC for its own traffic."w The Supreme Court trumped this entire debate
by vacating rule 319 in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa UtilitiesBoard,and the debate
200. See id.at para. 372.
201. See Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, para. 324, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267

(1997).
202. See Implementation of Local Competition Provisions of the Telecomms. Act of
1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, para. 526, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1
(1996) [hereinafter Local Competition Order]; 47 C.F.R. §51.319 (1998); Iowa Utils. Bd. v.
FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 525 U.S. 366 (1999);
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 1022 (1999) (vacating "Rule 319" of 47 U.S.C. §
52 because the FCC failed to adequately interpret the Act's "necessary" and "impairment"
standards); see also infraPart II.D.
203. FCCSummary, supra 183, at attachment vi-2.
204. See UNE Order, FCC 99-238, 1999 WL 1008985, para. 369 (1999) (footnote
omitted) (emphasis added).

205. The FCC released the Third Reconsideration Order on August 18, 1997 followed
by the Michigan Orderon August 19, 1997.
206. Third ReconsiderationOrder, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,460, para.22, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F)

1206 (1997).
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is now at least temporarily resolved by the UNE Order.
A second concern expressed over local switching was Ameritech's
refusal to supply all of the features of the switch as part of the switching
UNE, and particularly, Ameritech's failure to provide the routing table (the
information on which long-distance route is used for long-distance calls
that originate on a particular loop).m The FCC's concern here is consistent
with the concept of reducing entry barriers and was reiterated in the Third
Reconsideration Order, where the agency "conclude[d] that the Local
Competition Order was not ambiguous as to an incumbent LEC's
obligation to offer access to the routing table resident in the local switch to
'
requesting carriers that purchase access to the unbundled local switch."
Although Ameritech gained an admission in the FCC's UNE Order that
"the routing aspect of the local switching element may be proprietary," the
FCC argued that the routing table may meet the Act's necessary standard
and, even if it does not, it meets the impair standard, is not a basis on
which Ameritech competes or differentiates its product, and finally that
withholding it would jeopardize the goals of the Act. 210 Thus, like the trunk
port issue, the routing table issue is now at least temporarily resolved.
Part of the concerns over local transport and switching involved
Ameritech's treatment of end-to-end service as a resale item, which entitled
Ameritech to retain access charges, even if the service was provided over
combined UNEs (unless the CLEC satisfied Ameritech's requirement that
the service be provided over a dedicated trunk and dedicated trunk port).
This view provides the basis for Ameritech's refusal to provide shared
local trunking and shared trunk ports and is at odds with section
251(c)(3) of the Act, which requires that "[a]n incumbent local exchange
carrier shall provide such unbundled network elements in a manner that
allows requesting carriers to combine such elements in order to provide...
[a] telecommunications service."212 In the Local Competition Order, the
FCC issued rules requiring that CLECs be permitted to combine UNEs to
provide end-to-end services, 213 and these rules were upheld by both the
Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court. 214 Also, the Access Reform Order
207. See UNE Order,FCC 99-238, 1999 WL 1008985 (1999).
208. See NEwTON'S TELECOM DICIONARY 979 (9th ed. 1995).
209. Third ReconsiderationOrder,12 F.C.C.R. 12,460, para. 23, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F)

1206.
210. UNE Order,FCC 99-238, 1999 WL 1008985, paras. 247-52.
211. See Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R_ 20,543, para. 324, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267

(1997).
212. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (1994 & Supp.
213. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.315(a) (1998).

m11997).

214. The Eighth Circuit rejected the rules that require BOCs to combine UNEs on behalf
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clearly eliminates access charges in this case. 2 5 Since the FCC's
reinterpretation of the necessary and impairment standards continues to
regard shared local trunking and shared trunk ports as UNEs, Ameritech's
treatment of end-to-end service as resale is untenable. '6
This issue arose in South Carolina and Louisiana as well because
BellSouth's SGATs promised neither access to UNEs for purposes of
combining them nor enough specificity on collocation arrangements to
enable a determination that CLECs would be able to combine. 21 7 For
example, charges for physical collocation space preparation in a BellSouth
central office were unspecified in BellSouth's SGATs. The SGATs also did
not provide combining charges in the event that BellSouth combines UNEs
on behalf of a CLEC. BellSouth indicated that, like Ameritech, it would
regard end-to-end service as resale and retain the access charges, 18 in
which case there is little need to address combination arrangements. In the
Louisiana I1 Order, the FCC concluded that BellSouth's collocation
offering provided inadequate interconnection arrangements, and explicitly
used this as a basis for denial.2 9 Inparticular, the FCC argued that, since
the Act requires access to UNEs at all technically feasible points,
collocation cannot serve as the only method of combining UNEs. However,
the FCC characterized this as a failure to provide access to UNEs.
BellSouth achieved FCC acceptance of its shared local transport and local
switching offerings in the Louisiana 1I Order. The problems were with
access, the OSS used to achieve this access, and whether the BOC must
provide vertical features present in the switch as UNEs when the BOC does
not offer those features at retail.2 On this last point, the FCC not only
concluded that such features must be provided to CLECs, but further that
"a requesting carrier that takes an unbundled local switch must pay for all
of the vertical features included in the switch, even if it is unable to sell
those vertical features to end user customers."' '
of CLECs. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997). The Eight Circuit did
not reject the rule requiring that CLECs be permitted to combine UNEs. The Supreme Court

left intact the rule requiring that BOCs not separate requested, already combined UNEs. See
Iowa Utils.Bd., 120 F.3d at 736.
215. See Access Reform Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,982, para. 337, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
1209 (1997).
216. See UNE Order,FCC 99-238, 1999 WL 1008985, paras. 321,369 (1999).
217. See South Carolina Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 539, paras. 185, 197-209, 10 Comm. Reg.

(P & F) 870 (1998).
218. See id. atpara. 210.
219. See LouisianaII Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 20,599, paras. 161-65, 13 Comm. Reg. (P & F)

1082 (1998).
220. See id. at paras. 202-05, 210, 216-22.
221. Third ReconsiderationOrder, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,460, para. 47, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
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These positions taken by Ameritech and BellSouth are inconsistent
with the Act as interpreted by the Eighth Circuit and, probably, also as
interpreted by the Supreme Court. The Third ReconsiderationOrder, the
July 1998 FCCSummary on unbundied local transport, and the UNE Order
all indicate there are unresolved issues concerning transport specifically
between a BOC switch and a nonBOC switch when the CLEC does not
provide local exchange service, so the FCC has issued a Fourth Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.m Otherwise, the new necessary and
impairment standards will require BOCs to make shared local transport and
switching accessible with sufficient specificity, including all relevant
charges, to assure that combinations and the attendant accounting for
access charges are possible, even if combinations are used to provide endto-end service' m
In contrast, the New York Order notes that Bell Atlantic offered
multiple collocation options that can be used to combine UNEs. Further,
the actual commercial usage as well as the testing performed by KPMG
evidence nondiscriminatory access, despite some disputes concerning
access and certain restrictions imposed by Bell Atlantic, are unresolved
pending the outcome of the Fourth Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking.2 With the OSS and UNE combination issues resolved, Bell
Atlantic's unbundled local transport and local switching were remarkably
uncontroversial.2
E.

TELRIC Pricing

In the Local Competition Order, the FCC presented its theory of
pricing for interconnection and UNEs.m The central idea is that prices
should be based on forward-looking economic cost because, according to
the FCC, such prices will encourage efficient entry while discouraging
inefficient entry. The operational version of this concept is Total Element
Long Run Incremental Cost (TELRIC), a real-world proxy for theoretical
long-run marginal cost.
In Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC,the Iowa Utilities Board challenged
these pricing rules on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that Congress left the
specific determination of prices to the states and only granted the FCC
1206 (1997) (emphasis added).
222. See UNE Order,FCC 99-238, 1999 WL 1008985, para. 494 (1999).
223. See id.at paras. 321, 369.

224. See New York Order,FCC 99-404, 1999 WL 1243135, paras. 231-32, 235-36, 240
(Dec. 22, 1999).
225. See id. at paras. 338-39, 346.
226. See Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, paras. 618-862, 4 Comm. Reg.

(P &F) 1 (1996).
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authority to decide whether individual state determinations are consistent
with statutory standards.2 7 In particular, section 252(d)(1)(A) of the Act
only requires that interconnection and UNE prices be "based on the cost
(determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based
proceeding) of providing the interconnection or network element
(whichever is applicable), and... [be] nondiscriminatory."2' s On July 18,
1997, the Eighth Circuit agreed that the FCC had exceeded its authority
and vacated the TELRIC pricing rules.
This ruling provides the backdrop for the Michigan Order,which was
issued only thirty-two days later. No part of the formal determination in the
Michigan Order relies on an evaluation of interconnection and UNE prices.
But the FCC included advisory opinions which, while acknowledging that
the Eighth Circuit's ruling made it impossible for the agency to insist on
TELRIC prices in a review of section 252(d) compliance, nevertheless
indicated that the agency intended to use TELRIC principles in
determining whether a BOC is in compliance with the checklist and in
making a public interest determination2 9 This prompted the Iowa Utilities
Board to file another complaint asking the Eighth Circuit Court to enforce
its earlier decision.230 Before the court decided this second complaint, new
commissioners were appointed to the FCC and they rendered the Order on
BellSouth's South Carolina Application.
The South Carolina Order contains no reference to TELRIC and
bases its denial only on the failure to satisfy either Track A or Track B and
the failure to satisfy the checklist due to problems with OSS, inadequate
access and specificity regarding UNEs-particularly with regard to
combining of UNEs-and refusal to offer resale of certain services. The
separate statements of Commissioners Ness and Powell, however, indicate
division among the new commissioners over the TELRIC issue.
Commissioner Ness, while acknowledging that the "pricing provisions of
our InterconnectionOrder have been voided," continues that she does "not
read the [Eighth] Circuit's rulings as curtailing the FCC's role in
determinations on Bell company applications to offer long-distance
services," and that she "can find no statutory basis for treating the
determinations of state commissions-whether on pricing or on any other
checklist items-as dispositive for [s]ection 271 purposes. ' 3 In contrast,
227. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753,792 (8th Cir. 1997).
228. 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
229. See Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, paras. 288-90, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F)

267 (1997).
230. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 135 F.3d 535 (8th Cir. 1998).
231. South Carolina Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 539, 679, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 870, 949
(1998) (Separate Statement of Commissioner Susan Ness).
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Commissioner Powell states that he "respect[s] the genuinely held view of
some that the statute confers independent jurisdiction on the Commission
to establish pricing rules. I merely note that such
an interpretation is not
'2
Commissioners."
the
among
shared
universally
Twenty-nine days later the Eighth Circuit issued its second rulingagain in favor of the Iowa Utilities Board-ordering the FCC to cease and
desist from applying its pricing rules in both its checklist review and its
public interest determination. The court was clearly angered by the
FCC's continuing pursuit of TELRIC and chastised the agency for
violating "this central tenet of our decision" and making "clear its intention
to disregard those portions of our decision." The court went on to accuse
the FCC of "intimidat[ing]" and "coerc[ing] state commissions," using
"indirect[ion]" to pursue its policy goals, lacking "even the scent of merit"
in reasserting its local pricing authority, and attempting
to "evade ordinary
5
appellate review" in"an attempt to foram-shop.:Z
In response, the FCC made no mention of TELRIC in its Louisiana
Order and, notably, explicitly avoided pricing issues in the FCC Summary.
The agency also strictly honored the Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC decision
in the LouisianaI1 Order,declaring that "our [pricing] inquiry is complete"
after doing nothing more than confirming that "the Louisiana Commission
advises us that BellSouth's prices conform with its rules.' ' 26 This
capitulation appears half-hearted, however, as the agency's evaluation of
the unbundled local switching UNE quotes the Department of Justice,
which continues "to question whether competitors wishing to offer services
that use BellSouth's unbundled switching and vertical features are being
competitively disadvantaged by unreasonably high prices for those
unbundled elements.:' 23 7 While no formal determination was based on this
observation, the quote clearly misses the point that, according to the Eighth
Circuit Court, the FCC had no statutory basis to consider whether UNE
prices were unreasonably high once the agency determined that the prices
indeed conformed to the Louisiana Commission's rules, no matter what the
Department of Justice opined.
On January 25, 1999, the Supreme Court decided the challenge to
Iowa UtilitiesBoard by largely reversing the Eighth Circuit. In particular,
232.
233.
234.
235.

Ud at 685 (Separate Statement of Commissioner Michael K. Powell).
See Iowa Utils. Bd., 135 F.3d at 543.
Id. at 537-38 (citation omitted).
Id. at 539, 541-42.

236. Louisiana II Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 20,599, para. 60, 13 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1082

(1998).
237. Id at para. 210 n.677.
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the Court found that the FCC's TELRIC pricing rules do not exceed the
agency's jurisdiction. This opinion was based on the Court's conclusion
that the FCC "has explicitly been given rulemaking authority"238 over
pricing methodology because Congress inserted the 1996 Act into the
Communications Act of 1934, which states that the FCC "may prescribe
such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to
carry out the provisions of this chapter."' ' 9 Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, opined that 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) did not affect their view.2A
Under the Court's interpretation, the key language here is apply and
give jurisdiction.Essentially, the Court's view is unaffected by this section
because much of the 1996 Act does apply to intrastate service and some of
the 1996 Act gives jurisdiction to the FCC over intrastate service.
Therefore, the Court concluded that Congress must have intended to cross
the jurisdictional fence, and the only remaining question is how far. This is
where Justice Thomas, writing for the minority, disagrees with the majority
opinion: "In my view, the majority's interpretation of [section] 201(b)
necessarily implies that Congress sub silentio rendered [section] 2(b)m4 a
2
nullity by extending federal law to cover intrastate communications."U
Justice Thomas concluded that "the majority . . . must also point to
'unambiguous' and 'straightforward' evidence that Congress intended to
eliminate [section] 2(b)'s 'substantive jurisdictional limitation"' 243 and that
"Congress neither eliminated section 2(b) altogether nor added [sections]
251 and 252 [containing the provisions on interconnection, unbundling,
and pricing] to the list of provisions exempted from its jurisdictional
fence."2
The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Eighth Circuit,
which heard oral arguments on September 17, 1999. These arguments
address whether TELRIC pricing satisfies the statutory standards for
interconnection and UNE prices. 24" Hence, whether the TELRIC prices
being used in many states, based on the FCC's earlier advice, are consistent
with the Act is yet to be determined. Despite this, in the New York Order
238. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S.Ct. 721,731 n.7 (1999).
239.
240.
241.
242.

47 U. S. C. § 201(b) (1994).
See AT&T Corp., 119 S. Ct. at 730.
This refers to the Communications Act of 1934.
AT&T Corp., 119 S. CL at 744 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

243. Id. at 744.
244. Id.
245. Oral arguments heard before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in
Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC, September 17, 1999, as transcribed for the law firm of Kellog,
Huber, Hansen, Todd, & Evans PLLC, Washington, D.C. See 1999 Filings(visited Jan. 31,
2000) <http://Is.wustl.edu/8th.cir/FCC/fcc.htnl>.
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the FCC interprets the Supreme Court's decision as granting permission to
impose TELRIC prices, stating that "a BOC must show that its prices for
interconnection and unbundled network elements are based on forwardlooking, long-ran incremental costs" (i.e., TELRIC).24 The FCC shows
substantial deference, however, to the New York Public Service
Commissions pricing determinations and essentially relies on them for
checklist compliance.
To some degree, the Act's ambiguity and the attendant legal
maneuvering simply reflect disagreement over the basic economics of
TELRIC pricing. The economic motivation for TELRIC prices is that,
theoretically, prices equal long-run marginal cost in competitive markets in
long-run equilibrium. Hence, any firm that can achieve the theoretical
long-run level of cost efficiency can participate in a market in which its
input prices are set at TELRIC levels, while any firm that cannot achieve
this efficiency will not survive in such a market. In this way, it is argued,
TELRIC prices mimic the outcome of competitive markets, only allowing
efficient firms to survive.
There are two main objections to this argument. The first is that BOC
costs may not be at this theoretical minimal level because the regulated
environment in which many of those costs were incurred forced or
encouraged the BOC to depart from the theoretical minimum. This is the
stranded or embedded cost argument. The second is that the long-run is
very long indeed for industries with large sunk costs, and if technology is
advancing more rapidly than this, then even a perfectly competitive
industry will not price at this very low level because under these conditions
such prices never recover sunk costs. This argument is advanced by
Hausman, who also argues that the failure to recover sunk costs diminishes
incentives for both incumbents and entrants to invest in
telecommunications infrastructure. 24' In other words, the TELRIC focus on
a static long-run equilibrium is inappropriate for an industry in which the
dynamics consist of technological improvements occurring faster than the
industry can reach a static long-run equilibrium. This is the anticipatory
retardation argument advanced by Alfred Kahn.249 The debate over which
view is correct for the telecommunications industry is unresolved.

246. New York Order, FCC 99-404, 1999 WL 1243135, para. 237 (Dec. 22, 1999)
(emphasis added).
247. See ida at238, 240,259.
248. See Hausman, supra note 126, at 1-38.
249. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.'s Direct Testimony of Alfred E. Kahn at 5 (Tex.
Pub. Util. Comm'n Sept. 15, 1997) (Nos. 16189, 16196, 16226, 16285, 16290, 16455,
17579, 17587, 17781).
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F.

Pick and Choose
Section 252(i) of the Act requires that "[a] local exchange carrier...
make available any interconnection, service, or network element provided
under an agreement approved under this section to which it is a party to
any other requesting telecommunications carrier upon the same terms and
conditions as those provided in the agreement."2' a In the Local Competition
Order, the FCC interpreted this section to mean that BOCs had to allow
CLECs to obtain any individual interconnection, service, or UNE at the
terms specified in an existing agreement, even if the CLEC did not want
other parts of the agreement.2'
This rule became known as pick and choose and was challenged
along with the entire Local Competition Order in Iowa Utilities Board v.
FCC.2 Like TELRIC pricing, the Eighth Circuit vacated this rule and
ruled that BOCs need only make existing agreements available to CLECs
in their entirety in order to be providing interconnection, services, and
UNEs upon the same terms and conditions.25 3 But also like TELRIC
pricing, the FCC subsequently issued guidance that the availability of pick
and choose is demonstrative of efforts to open local markets and may be
considered as part of its public interest determination in future
applications?2 In the complaint requesting that the Eighth Circuit enforce
its earlier ruling, the Iowa Utilities Board did not request, and the court,
therefore, did not consider whether the FCC's guidance on pick and choose
violated the first Iowa Utilities Board decision. The Supreme Court,
however, heard arguments on pick and choose in AT&T Corp. v. FCC, as
part of the broad challenge to the Iowa Utilities Board decision.2 5 Like
TELRIC, the Court overturned the Eighth Circuit on pick and choose,
thereby reinstating the FCC's rule.2 6 The Court held that the "FCC's
interpretation is not only reasonable, it is the most readily a parent,"
because it "tracks the pertinent statutory language almost exactly.'
Reinstatement of pick and choose is due to the Supreme Court's view
that the FCC gave a reasonable reading of the statute. This view does not
address whether pick and choose is sound policy. Indeed, the proposition
250. 47 U.S.C. § 252(i) (1994 & Supp. Il 1997).
251. See Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, para. 1310, 4 Comm. Reg. (P &

F) 1 (1996).
252. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 800-01 (8th Cir. 1998).
253. See id at 801.
254. See Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, para. 392, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267

(1997).
255. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999).
256. See id.
257. Id. at 738.
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that "[a] carrier who wants one term from an existing agreement... should
be required to accept all the terms in the agreement" was characterized by
the Supreme Court as seeming "eminently fair."' 8 The economics of pick
and choose is superficially equivocal as well. The rule undoubtedly
decreases entry barriers at a gven point in time by making more options
immediately available to every CLEC. But the rule must also have a
chilling effect on negotiations, reducing the chance for the parties to
compromise. Since agreements between businesses operating in
competitive markets routinely have at least some customized terms and
conditions, available evidence suggests that private agreements have an
economic function in competitive markets7 9 Moreover, economic theory
broadly suggests that the ability to construct complete contracts enhances
welfare.2 6 Thus, when properly viewed over time, the pick and choose rule
appears to be anticompetitive. Since the Supreme Court has chosen to defer
to the FCC's interpretations of an ambiguous statute, the agency's chosen
interpretation is unfortunate indeed.
IV. LESS PROMINENT ISSUES IN THE SECTION 271 ORDERS
Aside from the six contentious issues reviewed in the previous
section, numerous other issues are discussed in the six extant section 271
Orders.26' Three of these are checklist items (vii) nondiscriminatory access
to 911 and E911 services, (ix) nondiscriminatory access to telephone
numbers, and (iv) availability of resale. Prior to the New York Order, the
FCC considered two of the structural requirements and the
nondiscrimination requirements involved in the third broad condition for
BOC entry as well. Finally, this Part discusses four other issues that the
FCC has mentioned as part of its general guidance to future applicants
regarding the public interest determination that is the fourth broad
condition for BOC entry.

A.

FurtherChecklist Items
In both the Michigan and South CarolinaOrders,the FCC discusses

258. Id.
259. See PAuL

MmROM

& JOHN ROBERTS,

ECONOMICS,

ORGANIZATON,

AND

MANAGEmNT 24, 127-29(1992).

260. See id.
261. See New York Order, FCC 99-404, 1999 WL 1243135 (Dec. 22, 1999); Oklahoma
Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 8685, 8 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 198 (1997); LouisianaOrder,13 F.C.C.R.
6245, 11 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 328 (1998); Louisiana 11 Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 20,599, 13
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1082 (1998); Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, 9 Comm. Reg. (P

& F) 267 (1997); South Carolina Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 539, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 870
(1998).
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reliability of 911 and E911 databases for CLEC customers. 6 2 The FCC
found a lack of parity between Ameritech and its rivals in Michigan and
cited this as a reason for denial. 62 3 Although there is some dispute in the
record surrounding the South Carolina Order, the FCC ultimately
determined that BellSouth satisfied this checklist item in South Carolina
and also in the Louisiana II proceeding.2 4 Apparently, for some CLEC
customers in Michigan, Ameritech's records were incomplete or were
improperly entered into databases, resulting in the name and/or address of
the CLEC appearing in the E911 database rather than the proper customer
information. Three instances are cited in the Michigan Order in which
emergency personnel were directed to an incorrect location as a result of
such database errors.' Further study of the databases revealed that the
incidence of E911 database errors was substantially higher among CLEC
customers than among Ameritech customers, and Ameritech was unable to
demonstrate that these errors were ultimately attributable to mistakes made
f
by CLECs. 6 There
was also an instance of trunks that were used for E911
traffic being deactivated. 6 7 There is little debate that the lack of parity
displayed by these circumstances is inconsistent with the statutory
requirement of nondiscriminatory access to E911 services. Rather, most of
the debate revolved around whether Ameritech had remedied the problems.
The FCC determined in the Michigan Orderthat the problems had not been
remedied by the time of application.
BellSouth had a policy in South Carolina of restricting the quantity of
telephone numbers a CLEC could reserve in advance without placing a
similar restriction on itself.26 This restriction was discussed as a possible
violation of the checklist requirement that access to OSS be
nondiscriminatory but can also be viewed as a violation of the checklist
item that access to telephone numbers be nondiscriminatory.2 69 Although
no formal finding was made, BellSouth agreed to drop the restriction670
BellSouth's OSS access required CLECs to rekey actual orders for service

262. See Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, paras. 32-33, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267;
South CarolinaOrder,13 F.C.C.R. 539, paras. 228-29, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 870.
263. See Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, para. 265, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267.
264. See South Carolina Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 539, para. 230, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
870; LouisianaI Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 20,599, par. 236, 13 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1082.
265. See Michigan Order,12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, para. 260, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267.

266. See id at para. 267.
267. See id. at para. 273.
268. See South Carolina Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 539, para. 177, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
870.
269. See id. atpara. 178.
270. See id. at paras. 177-79.
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after the preordering phase in which information on installation dates and
telephone numbers is provided to a customer. Hence, CLECs had to
reserve telephone numbers during the preordering phase in order to assure
that their customers would receive the promised telephone number.? This
could result in greater use of number reservations by CLECs than by"
BellSouth, which did not need to reserve telephone numbers prior to
placing an order for service because the preordering and ordering functions
are essentially simultaneous for BellSouth. It is likely that this type of
discriminatory access to telephone numbers will be remedied automatically
as part of any remedy for discriminatory OSS access. In the LouisianaII
Order,BellSouth was found to be in compliance with the checklist item on
numbering administration, and Bell Atlantic's OSS eliminated any
concerns with numbering assignment in New York. 7 2
Section 251(c)(4) of the Act imposes on all ILECs-whether or not
the ILEC is a BOC-the duty "to offer for resale at wholesale rates any
telecommunications service that the carrier provides at retail to subscribers
who are not telecommunications carriers; and.., not to prohibit, and not to
impose unreasonable or discriminatory conditions or limitations on, the
resale of such telecommunications service."2 In turn, the competitive
checklist requires that BOCs provide resale in accordance with this section.
This requirement was interpreted in the Local Competition Order to mean
that anything sold to an end-user is provided at retail and thus must be
made available for resale. 274 This interpretation was not vacated by the
Eighth Circuit decisions but in fact was specifically endorsed as it pertains
to discount offerings. 275 BellSouth offered volume discounts and other
special arrangements to certain customers under agreements known as
Contract Service Arrangements (CSAs). With the blessing of the South
Carolina Commission, BellSouth refused to offer these CSAs for resale,
arguing that they are not subject to the wholesale discount because they are
already discounted.276 BellSouth's refusal is in plain violation of the
requirement, upheld by the Eighth Circuit, that all services sold to an enduser be offered for resale, and hence, BellSouth's refusal was cited as a
271. See id. atparas. 175-76.

272. See New York Order,FCC 99-404, 1999 WL 1243135, paras. 91, 132, 364 (Dec.
22, 1999); LouisianaIf Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 20,599, para. 262, 13 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1082

(1998).
273. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4) (Supp. II 1996).
274. See Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, para. 871, 4 Comm. Reg. (P &

F) 1 (1996).
275. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 818-19 (8th Cir. 1997).
276. See South CarolinaOrder, 13 F.C.C.R. 539, para. 214, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 870

(1998).
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reason for denial in both South Carolina and Louisiana.2 7 In the FCC
Summary on resale, the agency reiterated its conclusion in the Local
Competition Order, which was upheld by the Eighth Circuit, that CLECs
must be allowed to disaggregate volume offerings like CSAs and then
resell the disaggregated services.278
This requirement is consistent with the general theory of wholesale
discounts contained in the Act and the Local Competition Order, but may
present new arbitrage opportunities if the wholesale discounts for both
CSAs and other services do not truly reflect avoided costs2 79 The FCC
noted that a different wholesale discount might be appropriate for CSAs
than for other retail services, and that heterogeneous discounts of this sort
will be allowed as long as they are based on avoided cost as required by the
Act . 0 Such discounts must be properly determined in a state commission
proceeding rather than implicitly offered at zero by a blanket exception for
281
CSAs. Thus, a separate determination of the appropriate wholesale
discount for CSAs is an essential part of the resale scheme. Indeed, the
New York Public Service Commission made such determinations prior to
Bell Atlantic's application in New York, and the FCC specifically noted
this as part of its determination that Bell Atlantic resale offerings in New
York meet the statutory standard.2 Even though BellSouth dropped its
objection to wholesale discounting of CSA's in the Louisiana H1
proceeding, the FCC still found that the resale checklist item was not
satisfied, due to continuing inadequacies in BellSouth's OSS.2" In the
Louisiana If Order, the FCC gave explicit determinations on every
checklist item. Aside from the items already mentioned, other relatively
minor checklist issues arose.2 4
277. See ida at para. 215; Louisiana Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 6245, para. 63, 11 Comm. Reg.

(P &F) 328 (1998).
278. See Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, para. 877, 4 Comm. Reg. (P &

F) 1.
279. For arbitrage possibilities created by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the
Local Competition Order,see David M. Mandy & Larry R. Blank, Resale, Unbundling, and
Competition in the Local Exchange: What Have Congress and the FCC Wrought? (Dec. 1,
1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Federal CommunicationsLaw Journal).

280. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(3) (Supp. H 1996).
281. See South CarolinaOrder,13 F.C.C.R. 539, paras. 219-20, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
870.
282. See New York Order, FCC 99-404, 1999 WL 1243135, paras. 381 n.1178, 385
(Dec. 22, 1999); South CarolinaOrder, 13 F.C.C.R. 539, paras. 219-20, 10 Comm. Reg. (P

&F) 870.

283. See Louisiana I Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 20,599, para. 309-10, 13 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
1082 (1998).
284. See id. These minor checklist items include: performance data on loop provisioning
that was not sufficiently disaggregated; unnecessarily long cutover intervals when
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B.

StructuralRequirements
Two potential violations of the structural requirements for a separate
long-distance affiliate of the BOC arose in the Michigan proceeding. First,
section 272(b)(3) of the Act requires that a BOC's long-distance affiliate
"shall have separate officers, directors, and employees from the [BOC] of
which it is an affiliate. ' 285 Ameritech Michigan's long-distance affiliate is
organized as a closely-held corporation, which under Delaware law (the
state of incorporation) is not required to have directors. 286 Ameritech
argued that, since its long-distance affiliate did not have directors, it
automatically satisfied the requirement that its directors be separate.Y
According to the FCC, however, the relevant corporate law imposes the
duties, responsibilities, and liabilities of directors on the stockholders of a
closely-held corporation that does not have its own directors. In the case
at hand, Ameritech Michigan's long-distance affiliate is one hundred
percent owned by the parent BOC, meaning that Ameritech is the de facto
director.289 The FCC correctly cited this thinly-veiled attempt to circumvent
the Act as a reason for denial in Michigan.2 °
The second potential violation of a structural requirement involves
section 272(b)(5), which requires that the separate long-distance affiliate
"shall conduct all transactions with the [BOC] of which it is an affiliate on
an arm's length basis with any such transactions reduced to writing and
available for public inspection." 9 ' Ameritech did not include in its public
disclosures the prices for services exchanged between the parent BOC and
the long-distance affiliate, did not publicly disclose transactions that were
concluded before the FCC's Accounting Safeguards Order was released,

and did not publicly disclose transactions between its long-distance
affiliate and other Ameritech affiliates that allegedly sell UNEs and resell
retail services.2 92 First, while the Act does not explicitly require that prices
unbundled loops were switched from one carrier to another, no showing that directory
assistance and operator services were offered; and inadequate showing that interim number
portability was timely-due to alleged problems coordinating number portability with loop
cutovers and some doubts whether BellSouth's pricing of number portability satisfied FCC
rules. See id.
285. 47 U.S.C. § 272(b)(3) (Supp. 111996).
286. See Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, para. 355, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267
(1997).
287. See id. at para. 349.
288. See id. at para. 353.
289. See itL at para. 354.
290. See id. at para. 353.
291. 47 U.S.C. § 272(b)(5) (Supp. I 1996).
292. See Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, paras. 367-73, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
267 (referring to Implementation of the Telecomms. Act of 1996: Accounting Safeguards
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be included in public disclosures, the arm's length standard suggests that
prices must be a part of these intraBOC transactions. If Ameritech reduced
such an arm's length transaction to writing, as required, then the written
transaction made available for public inspection must include prices.
Moreover, the FCC interprets the Accounting Safeguards Order as
requiring that the prices be disclosed. 293 Second, while the FCC has
indicated that it may agree to a reduced disclosure standard for transactions
concluded prior to the Accounting Safeguards Order,there is no exception
in the Act for such transactions.29 4 Third, the alleged nondisclosure
certainly violates the spirit of section 272(b)(5). 295 Whether this is a legal
violation depends on whether Ameritech's other affiliates are, as a matter
of law, the BOC referred to in this section of the Act. The FCC maintains
that "any successor or assign of the BOC is subject to the section 272
requirements in the same manner as the BOC."2 6 Hence, each of
Ameritech's three nondisclosures probably violates the Act, although the
FCC only formally
ruled on the first item as a reason for denial in the
7
Michigan OrderY
Similar issues arose in the Louisiana11 Order.298 The FCC concluded
that certain transactions between BellSouth and its affiliate had not been
disclosed, including the rates, terms, and conditions.2 Perhaps more
importantly, the FCC concluded that BellSouth's problematic OSS violated
the nondiscrimination safeguards since, as discussed above, it failed to
provide
access for CLECs at parity with the access BellSouth provided for
300
itself.
IN contrast, Bell Atlantic has three affiliates for in-region interLATA
service, all of which are wholly owned by Bell Atlantic but have separate
officers, directors, and employees. Moreover, although there was some
controversy in the New York proceeding concerning Bell Atlantic's
disclosures of transactions with its affiliates, the FCC found that Bell
Under the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 2993, 5 Comm. Reg. (P
& F) 861 (1996)).
293. See id. at para. 369.
294. See id. at para. 371.
295. See 47 U.S.C. § 272(b)(5) (Supp. I 1996).
296. Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, para. 373, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267 (1997)

(footnote omitted).
297. See id.
at para. 367.
298. See Louisiana II Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 20,599, par. 91, 13 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1082

(1998).
299. See id.
at paras. 332-39.
300. See id. at paras. 340-47.
301. See New York Order, FCC 99-404, 1999 WL 1243135, paras. 405, 409 (Dec. 22,

1999).
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Atlantic met the statutory standard. °2
Part I.B notes that an economic rationale for the separate affiliate
requirement is to reduce the incentive for sabotage by separating the
decision making of the BOC and its affiliate and also requiring that the
BOC deal with its affiliate on the same terms as it deals with other
providers of interLATA service. This objective is defeated if the BOC, as
director, can dictate the affiliate's policies or can give its affiliate
preferential treatment by hiding transactions or the terms of transactions
between itself and its affiliate. Thus, the concerns raised over directorship,
all three of Ameritech's nondisclosures, BellSouth's nondisclosures, and
BellSouth's OSS are consistent with economic theory.
C. OtherPublic InterestConcerns
An explicit allegation of tying is discussed in the Michigan Order.
Ameritech was accused of refusing to sell intraLATA toll service to a
customer unless that customer also purchased local exchange service from
Ameriteh. 303 This alleged tie is different from the example mentioned
above in Part ll.A. Local exchange service is actually the tied good here,
while intraLATA toll is the tying good. The objective of Ameritech's
alleged tie cannot be to evade regulations on the tying good, since the tied
good is also regulated and hence provides little opportunity to extract
additional monopoly profit. The objective also cannot be to price
discriminate, since the tied good (local exchange service) is not usually
priced according to usage. This leaves only foreclosure of the tied good
market as a possible undesirable objective for Ameritech's alleged tie-in.
Conceivably, Ameritech might benefit from foreclosing the market for
local exchange service but not in the traditional way of enabling monopoly
pricing in that market since the market is so heavily regulated. The benefit
would have to come from being able to sabotage or exercise market power
in another market by virtue of controlling the local exchange market. These
incentives could be present if the incentive to sabotage is not adequately
controlled by regulation, or if consumer preferences for one-stop shopping
are strong enough to enable supracompetitive pricing of bundles on the part
of the only firm supplying complete service bundles.
But there is another problem with this tying allegation. In order for a
tie-in sale to have any chance of accomplishing the undesirable objectives
for tying discussed in Part I.A., the tying firm must possess power in the
tying good's market. To the extent that intraLATA dialing parity was not
302. See id. at paras. 411-414.
303. See Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, para. 377, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267
(1997).
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implemented in Michigan, Ameritech did possess some market power in
the market for intraLATA services. It is not clear whether that power was
sufficient to cause much difficulty in other markets, since consumers could
easily dial around Ameritech in the event Ameritech charged supracompetitive prices for its one-stop shopping bundles. Experience with
equal access in interLATA markets suggests that substantial market power
persists at least until dialing parity is established. Even if this experience is
mirrored in intraLATA markets, the market power will be reduced exactly
when Ameritech is given access to the markets in which the power might
be exercised. This is because the Act explicitly requires intraLATA toll
dialing parity as a condition for selling interLATA services. Section
271(e)(2)(A) states: "A [BOC] granted authority to provide interLATA
services under subsection (d) of this section shall provide intraLATA toll
dialing parity throughout that State coincident with its exercise of that
authority."3' Hence, Ameritech's alleged tie-in must stem from a welfareenhancing objective and thus should be of no concern to regulators.
In conclusion, the alleged tie is not itself a cause for concern. This
does not mean that a BOC's potential market power in one-stop shopping
is benign. It simply means that the BOC gains nothing in the exercise of
any monopoly power by tying. Any such monopoly power can be exercised
without tying by setting prices for one-stop bundles above costs, while still
allowing the purchase of separate components of the bundles so there is no
requiredtie. If the BOC is the only supplier of one-stop bundles, perhaps
due to monopoly provision of local exchange service, then the potential
exists for bundles to be priced above cost, to the extent consumers place
higher value on bundles. The extent of monopoly power over bundles is
debatable since any reseller can, in principle, provide all the same bundles
that the BOC can provide. However, product differentiation can create
market power, therefore BOCs may be able to price bundles above cost if
there are real or perceived quality differences. However, the real problem
in this scenario is the monopoly power created by product differentiation,
not any uniqueness in the BOC's ability to offer bundles.
Ameritech's "ValueLink" and "Winback" programs are also
mentioned in the Michigan Order as potentially anticompetitive.
ValueLink offers low prices on intraLATA services in exchange for
committing to a termination fee.306 If consumers are relatively ill-informed
when they commit to ValueLink and make this commitment without
304. 47 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (Supp. I 1996).
305. See Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, paras. 377-78, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F)

267.
306. See id. at paras. 377-78.
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knowledge of future more advantageous offerings that will become
available, the plan could decrease consumer welfare. Such a decrease
might occur if consumers' marginal decisions to switch to a more
advantageous plan are sufficiently impacted by the termination fee. But a
determination of the net effect on welfare must tradeoff the welfare
benefits consumers receive in the short-run from the lower ValueLink
prices against any subsequent welfare losses. The short-run benefits are
likely to dominate unless the commitment to the termination penalty is
lengthy. These same considerations apply to termination fees that are
included in CSAs, which were mentioned as an item of concern in the
South Carolina Order.W For CSAs, a welfare loss due to the termination
fee is even less likely because the consumers of CSAs are usually larger,
better-informed purchasers. The main concern, however, expressed over
termination fees in CSAs is whether they apply when a CLEC resells the
services obtained through the CSA. Bell Atlantic satisfied the FCC's
concerns over termination fees for CSAs by only imposing the fees if the
CSA is terminated, not if the CSA is assigned.3
Although not firmly established in the Michigan Order, Ameritech's
"Winback" program allegedly misused customer proprietary network
information (CPNI) in order to win back customers who switched their
local exchange service to a CLEC.3 If Ameritech knows of a customer's
status from its role in forwarding customer service records to the CLEC,
this is a violation of section 222(c)(1) of the Act unless the customer has
agreed in writing to allow Ameritech to use the information. 310 Ameritech
argued that customers had agreed to let their information be used for
marketing but apparently did not produce any documents that demonstrated
this agreement in writing.*" Alternatively, if a BOC identifies a group of
CLEC customers by comparing its own customer list to a publiclyavailable directory and then targets this group for marketing, this may not
be a violation of the Act. The Michigan Order is not specific enough to
determine exactly how Ameritech identified customers for marketing and
the allegation was not ruled on by the FCC.31 2 Use of CPNI for marketing
purposes has the potential to enable price discrimination, allowing the
ELEC to determine which consumers must be offered a lower price due to
their more elastic demand, as evidenced by their willingness to switch to a
307. See South CarolinaOrder, 13 F.C.C.R. 539, para. 222, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 870

(1998).
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

See New York Order,FCC 99-404, 1999 WL 1243135, para. 390 (Dec. 22, 1999).
See Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, para. 379,9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267.
See 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1) (Supp. I 1996).
See Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, para. 380,9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267.
See id atpara. 380.
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CLEC. Once again, the welfare effects of this price discrimination are
ambiguous because high-elasticity consumers benefit from lower prices,
while low-elasticity consumers will actually be charged higher prices since
the ILEC need not worry as much about driving customers away. This
approach has been used by IXCs, who market more aggressive prices to
consumers that switch to a competitor, but this can be viewed as a natural
result of competition as long as all competitors have equal access to the
information that is used for marketing. Without such equal access, an
otherwise less-efficient firm can compete solely on the basis of a marketing
cost advantage, which can harm welfare. In the UNE Order,the FCC again
warned that Winback must be administered in a nondiscriminatory
313
manner.
A different public interest concern expressed in the Michigan Order
is the availability of all three methods (resale, UNEs, and facilities) of
entry. 314 This is a broad concern but overall the Act clearly imposes
requirements that are designed to force BOCs to accommodate all three
methods. Economic theory is more equivocal on this issue. As discussed
herein, reducing entry barriers helps to bring the benefits of competition to
the local exchange market, reduces incentives to raise rivals' costs, and
may eliminate some undesirable incentives to tie sales. However, the
particular manner in which the three methods interact creates some
undesirable incentives. In particular, the simultaneous presence of these
methods encourages arbitrage on the part of entrants that is unrelated to the
actual cost of providing service.315 One version of this arbitrage involves
focusing primarily on business customers and using UNEs and facilities to
serve them. UNE prices (and of course facility costs) are cost-based and
access provided over LNEs is not subject to access charges, while existing
retail business prices are above cost. In conjunction with this, resale is used
to serve residential customers, because wholesale prices are not cost-based
but instead are tied to the frequently below-cost retail prices for residential
service.3 The incentives for this type of arbitrage can only be removed by
allowing residential prices to reflect cost and then making certain that any
gap between cost and a politically-acceptable target price is covered with a
competitively-neutral universal service mechanism.
313. See UNE Order,FCC 99-238, 1999 WL 1008985, para. 436 n.854 (1999).
314. See id. atpara. 387.
315. See Mandy & Blank, supranote 279.
316. Some mild evidence of this appears in the Michigan Order. TCG and MFS
WorldCom exclusively serve business customers in Michigan, while 73% of Brooks Fiber's
access lines are for business service. See Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, paras. 64-68,
9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 267. Neither Brooks nor TCG use resale, while the intensity with
which WorldCom uses resale is disputed in the record. See id.
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Yet another public interest concern raised in the Michigan Order is
the level of performance monitoring and future commitment offered by
Ameritech. 317 This is reemphasized in the LouisianaII Order and the New
York Order.3" As mentioned above in Part H.B., monitoring and penalty
structures play a role in preventing sabotage. Future commitments to
reduce entry barriers in markets for local exchange service play a role too,
in that competition in local exchange markets helps deter sabotage and
undesirable tie-ins, in addition to the direct benefits competition brings in
the form of a price/service mix that is most advantageous for consumers.
The harm from insistence on stringent performance monitoring
arrangements and future commitments before allowing interLATA entry is
twofold, also as discussed in Part l.B. First is the opportunity cost of
delayed long-distance competition. Second, to the extent that the link
between interLATA entry and local competition delays local competition,
additional opportunity costs accrue. Regarding whether required
performance monitoring and future commitments are consistent with the
Act, section 271(d)(6) grants the FCC clear authority to enforce continuing
compliance with the requirements for BOCs' interLATA entry.319 This
section enables a formal complaint process to review allegations of
postentry BOC noncompliance. This section does not, however, grant
authority to prejudge future compliance. Thus, ex ante requirements that
BOCs agree to report on performance and adhere to certain commitments
outside of a formal complaint process must be regarded as part of the
FCC's public interest determination, and are presented as such in the New
York Order.3 °
A final area of concern mentioned in the Michigan Order is the
possible role of nonrecurring charges and state and local policies as barriers
to entry into the market for local exchange service. 32 Nonrecurring charges
are only an entry barrier if they are sunk. As long as CLECs can freely
sublease the access whose acquisition involves nonrecurring costs or
otherwise recoup the market value of such access through, for example, a
merger, there is no sunk cost involved. For instance, a space preparation
fee for a collocation space is not sunk if CLECs can buy and sell their
access and usage rights to the collocation space on an open market.
317. See id. atparas. 393-94, 399-400.
318. See New York Order,FCC 99-404, 1999 WL 1243135, paras. 431-433 (Dec. 22,
1999); LouisianaII Order,13 F.C.C.R. 20,599, paras. 363-64, 13 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1082
(1998).
319. See 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(6) (Supp. II1996).
320. See New York Order,FCC 99-404, 1999 WL 1243135, paras. 433-434.
321. See Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, paras. 395-96, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
267.
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Whether this type of trading would be opposed by BOCs and, if so
enforced by regulators, has not been addressed in the extant Orders.
With regard to government policies, it is obvious that governments
can erect entry barriers and that entry barriers can harm economic
welfare.3 2 The issue is whether the FCC has authority to police-through
the section 271 application process-what the agency perceives as an entry
barrier created by a state or local policy. Certain powers are clearly left to
the states by the Act. For example, even the majority opinion in AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa UtilitiesBoard admits that the states have some discretion in
setting UNE and interconnection prices under the FCC's TELRIC rubric.3
More broadly, if a state or local policy is consistent with the powers left to
those governments by the Telecommunications Act, the FCC would be in
danger of exceeding its authority by basing a section 271 application denial
on a determination that the approval does not serve the public interest
because the policy in question erects an entry barrier.32 The balance of
power between the states and the FCC is contentious and difficult to judge
hypothetically. But it seems virtually certain that the FCC will generate a
court challenge if the agency bases a future section 271 application denial
on what it deems to be state and local policies that erected entry barriers.
V. CONCLUSION

A. Summary of QuestionableFCCPositions
In the preceding sections, seven opinions expressed by the FCC as
either actual or potential reasons for denying a section 271 application
were identified as questionable for either economic or statutory reasons.
First is the interpretation of Track B compliance. The agency's
interpretation creates perverse incentives and has the potential to
unnecessarily forestall BOC entry for a lengthy period. However, the
courts have ruled it is consistent with the Act.
Second is TELRIC pricing. There is substantial legal and economic
disagreement surrounding the FCC's advocacy of TELRIC, even at the
322. Government-erected entry barriers do not always harm welfare. For example, the
entire economic logic of granting a franchise monopoly to a public utility rests on the notion
that the utility is an unsustainable natural monopoly which must be protected in order to
achieve productive efficiency.
323. "Mhe FCC's prescription, through rulemaking, of a requisite pricing methodology

no more prevents the [sltates from establishing rates than do the statutory 'Pricing
standards' set forth in [section] 252(d) [of the Act]. It is the States that will apply those
standards and implement that methodology, determining the concrete result in particular
circumstances." AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct.721 732 (1999).
324. See 47 U.S.C. § 271 (Supp. HI 1996).
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Supreme Court. This suggests that the agency should reconsider the policy,
and at least grant the states substantial latitude in deciding what prices meet
the TELRIC standard. Substantial inertia toward TELRIC was created by
the Local Competition Order,3z and state commissions now need to

consider the criticisms of TELRIC and decide what version of TELRIC is
right for their state and whether their version is likely to survive FCC
scrutiny. Although the FCC insisted on TELRIC in its approval of Bell
Atlantic's New York application, the Eighth
26 Circuit has not yet ruled on
whether TELRIC is consistent with the Act.
The remaining five opinions all pertain to the FCC's view of its
public interest determination. Pick and choose apparently remained on the
agency's agenda, despite the Iowa Utilities Board decision, and that
persistence has now been legally vindicated by the AT&T Corp. decision.
But even the Supreme Court has doubts about the economics of pick and
choose. This rule is very similar to a most favored nation clause, which is
usually viewed with suspicion because of its anticompetitive effects.3 7 Yet
the FCC continues to insist that BOCs signal their commitment to
competition by agreeing to such rules.
Allegations of tying also attract the agency's attention but with little
consideration of the true welfare effects of the alleged tie. Tying local
exchange service to intraLATA simply cannot be harmful to consumers in
the presence of intraLATA equal access.
Furthermore, concerns with termination fees seem to ignore the
welfare-enhancing effects of lower prices during the term of the
commitment. Also ignored is the impossibility of reducing welfare through
an optional price offering, unless consumers are substantially uninformed.
Misuse of proprietary information is a serious allegation, and the FCC
appropriately attaches importance to such charges. But conducting a
marketing campaign that can be carried out with publicly available
information and that offers consumers lower prices is of little concern. In
this case the BOC simply must be instructed to make certain it organizes its
campaign around generally available data.
Nonrecurring charges are only a concern if they are sunk. The FCC
has yet to adequately address the question of whether such charges are
sunk. Finally, while it is understandable that concern exists over the entrydeterring effects of some state and local policies, such policies may be
outside the agency's jurisdiction.
325. See Local Competition Order,11 F.C.C.R. 15,499,4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1996).

326. See New York Order,FCC 99-404, 1999 WL 1243135, para. 238 (Dec. 22, 1999).
327. See Thomas E. Cooper, Most FavoredCustomer Pricing and Tacit Collusion, 17
RAND J. EcoN. 377 (1986).
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B. Summary of Sound FCCPositions
There are many opinions and decisions of the FCC expressed as
either actual or potential reasons for denying or approving a section 271
application that are carefully considered, sound economically, and well
within the agency's charge. For these, actions that future applicants and
state commissions can undertake to strengthen the applications have either
been suggested by the FCC or naturally suggest themselves. In general, the
agency's evaluation of checklist compliance has been especially strong
(except its insistence on TELRIC).
First, it is clear that CLECs must receive access to OSS that
approaches parity. The FCC advised that comparative data on true average
installation intervals (not percentage of commitments met) be reported in
future applications. Demonstrative is comparative data on frequency of
problem orders (order flow-through rates), although the FCC evaluated
other measures in lieu of these in the New York Order; average inform
intervals for reporting such problems; and inform intervals for order
confirmations and completions. 328 In the Louisiana II Order, the FCC
explicitly invited statistical analyses of whether differences in these
statistics between the BOC and CLECs are significant and considered such
analyses in the New York Order.3z
Second, consumers must be oblivious to interconnection. The FCC
has advised that true comparative trunk blocking rates be reported, a sound
suggestion that was followed in New York, although the agency should
guard against placing undue weight on CLECs' views of equal quality.33
Third, to reduce entry barriers access to unbundled local transport and
switching must be superior to that offered by Ameritech and BellSouth.
The existing rules and statutory interpretations make it clear that BOCs
cannot arbitrarily label an end-to-end service as resale simply because it is
not carried over dedicated facilities. Truly shared trunk and trunk port
UNEs must be included in interconnection agreements and/or SGATs, with
the methods used to meter usage explicitly specified. It must be explicit
that local switching UNEs include the necessary features. SGATs and/or
interconnection agreements also need to completely specify access and
combination methods and all relevant charges. The FCC has suggested that
data be reported on the time it takes to actually accomplish physical or
virtual collocation.331 The Bell Atlantic explicitly addresses all of these
328. See New York Order,FCC 99-404, 1999 WL 1243135, paras. 161-63.

329. See id. at app. b.
330. Seeid. atpara. 69.
331. See South CarolinaOrder, 13 F.C.C.R. 539, para. 93, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 870
(1998).
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issues its New York application.
Fourth, it is inadequate to simply make efforts to solve problems with
E911. The reliability of these systems is too politically sensitive for local
competition to proceed without the same high quality that BOCs have
traditionally provided. The FCC has suggested that applications include
comparative error rates in E911 databases. Databases, although the agency
relied on the declarations of Bell Atlantic, KPMG, and the New York
Public Service Commission in the New York Order.332
Fifth, resale of volume-discounted services is required, but its success
depends on correct pricing. Interconnection agreements and SGATs need
to specify appropriate, perhaps distinct, wholesale discounts for volume
offerings that are determined by the avoided cost from wholesaling volume
offerings.
Sixth, the structural requirements and separations safeguards are
important in deterring sabotage. Long-distance affiliates must be
separately-run and must demonstrate that fact. The requirements are easy to
meet if they are adhered to in spirit.
Seventh, although there are some problems with the economics,
simultaneous availability of resale, UNEs, and interconnection is dictated
by the Act. SGATs and interconnection agreements must make it plain that
all three are available.
Finally, there are also some problems with the economics of, and
statutory requirements for, performance monitoring and future
commitments. However, policies designed to ensure that entry barriers are
and will continue to be demonstrably lowered indeed serve the public
interest. Section 271 applications can approach these suggestions by
including as much specificity as possible.

332. See New York Order,FCC 99-404, 1999 WL 1243135, para. 350.

